TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Xefteris, Dimitros
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/770
AB  - Under what circumstances do coalition partners tend to overspend? The so-far dominant explanation relies on the common pool resource theory-the more cabinet members there are, the higher the spending. While theoretically sound, this explanation seems to be more relevant for some cases and less for others. What could lie behind this discrepancy? While the literature to date has focused on institutional factors, we propose a mechanism that relates to voting behaviour. Relying on the concept of positional externalities, we argue that each coalition member wishes to spend relatively more resources than the other coalition member(s) to attract impressionable voters. Positional externalities, we claim, exhibit a direct positive effect on total spending and, perhaps more importantly, interact with the common pool resource factor, decreasing its relevance when they are weak.
PB  - Springer, New York
T2  - Constitutional Political Economy
T1  - Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities
EP  - 457
IS  - 4
SP  - 446
VL  - 31
DO  - 10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Xefteris, Dimitros",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Under what circumstances do coalition partners tend to overspend? The so-far dominant explanation relies on the common pool resource theory-the more cabinet members there are, the higher the spending. While theoretically sound, this explanation seems to be more relevant for some cases and less for others. What could lie behind this discrepancy? While the literature to date has focused on institutional factors, we propose a mechanism that relates to voting behaviour. Relying on the concept of positional externalities, we argue that each coalition member wishes to spend relatively more resources than the other coalition member(s) to attract impressionable voters. Positional externalities, we claim, exhibit a direct positive effect on total spending and, perhaps more importantly, interact with the common pool resource factor, decreasing its relevance when they are weak.",
publisher = "Springer, New York",
journal = "Constitutional Political Economy",
title = "Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities",
pages = "457-446",
number = "4",
volume = "31",
doi = "10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Xefteris, D.. (2020). Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities. in Constitutional Political Economy
Springer, New York., 31(4), 446-457.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6

Pavlović D, Xefteris D. Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities. in Constitutional Political Economy. 2020;31(4):446-457.
doi:10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Xefteris, Dimitros, "Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities" in Constitutional Political Economy, 31, no. 4 (2020):446-457,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6 . .