TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Arandarenko, Mihail
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1054
AB  - We investigate post-commu- nist redistributive policies in Serbia, focus- ing particularly on the period after 2000. Our main argument is that market funda- mentalism, which posits that the market is the most efficient solution for the post- communist transition, has failed to deliver on its promises. The expectation was that, after a temporary transitional sacrifice, the worse-off would benefit equally with the better-off by reaping the rewards of market economic reforms. The anticipated faster growth was supposed to generate more quality jobs as the most effective means to alleviate poverty. Unfortunately, growth has been sluggish, while inequalities in Ser- bia have experienced rapid and persistent growth since 2000. We look into redistribu- tive reform measures to understand the reasons behind this outcome. Our approach
combines applied political philosophy with economic policy analysis – a unique in- tersection of two social science disciplines. Firstly, our research explores the implicit and explicit normative foundations of post- communist economic reforms. Secondly, we identify and analyse a pivotal juncture of policy reform in the early 2000s. During this period, the newly-adopted neoliberal taxation and social policies were combined with class- and ethnic-based discriminato- ry approaches inherited from the pre-1990s socialist era and the post-socialist 1990s, respectively. This combination resulted in distinct, notably pro-rich redistributive patterns in Serbia.
PB  - Beograd : Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu
T2  - Economic Annals
T1  - Egalitarianism and Redistributive Reform in Serbia After 2000
EP  - 36
IS  - 237
SP  - 7
VL  - LXVIII
DO  - 10.2298/EKA2337007P
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Arandarenko, Mihail",
year = "2023",
abstract = "We investigate post-commu- nist redistributive policies in Serbia, focus- ing particularly on the period after 2000. Our main argument is that market funda- mentalism, which posits that the market is the most efficient solution for the post- communist transition, has failed to deliver on its promises. The expectation was that, after a temporary transitional sacrifice, the worse-off would benefit equally with the better-off by reaping the rewards of market economic reforms. The anticipated faster growth was supposed to generate more quality jobs as the most effective means to alleviate poverty. Unfortunately, growth has been sluggish, while inequalities in Ser- bia have experienced rapid and persistent growth since 2000. We look into redistribu- tive reform measures to understand the reasons behind this outcome. Our approach
combines applied political philosophy with economic policy analysis – a unique in- tersection of two social science disciplines. Firstly, our research explores the implicit and explicit normative foundations of post- communist economic reforms. Secondly, we identify and analyse a pivotal juncture of policy reform in the early 2000s. During this period, the newly-adopted neoliberal taxation and social policies were combined with class- and ethnic-based discriminato- ry approaches inherited from the pre-1990s socialist era and the post-socialist 1990s, respectively. This combination resulted in distinct, notably pro-rich redistributive patterns in Serbia.",
publisher = "Beograd : Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu",
journal = "Economic Annals",
title = "Egalitarianism and Redistributive Reform in Serbia After 2000",
pages = "36-7",
number = "237",
volume = "LXVIII",
doi = "10.2298/EKA2337007P"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Arandarenko, M.. (2023). Egalitarianism and Redistributive Reform in Serbia After 2000. in Economic Annals
Beograd : Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu., LXVIII(237), 7-36.
https://doi.org/10.2298/EKA2337007P

Pavlović D, Arandarenko M. Egalitarianism and Redistributive Reform in Serbia After 2000. in Economic Annals. 2023;LXVIII(237):7-36.
doi:10.2298/EKA2337007P .

Pavlović, Dušan, Arandarenko, Mihail, "Egalitarianism and Redistributive Reform in Serbia After 2000" in Economic Annals, LXVIII, no. 237 (2023):7-36,
https://doi.org/10.2298/EKA2337007P . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1056
AB  - The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown‑related democratic de‑cline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideologicaland regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in thesame manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish theauthority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency providesan ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe thatautocratic regimes with a ‘pre‑existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. Tocontribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post‑communist Central andSoutheast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic‑related state ofemergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the mostimportant of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy,autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election touse the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory,they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thusundermining democracy.
PB  - Prague : Sciendo
T2  - Politics in Central Europe
T1  - Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe
EP  - 643
IS  - 3
SP  - 621
VL  - 19
DO  - 10.2478/pce-2023-0029
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown‑related democratic de‑cline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideologicaland regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in thesame manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish theauthority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency providesan ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe thatautocratic regimes with a ‘pre‑existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. Tocontribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post‑communist Central andSoutheast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic‑related state ofemergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the mostimportant of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy,autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election touse the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory,they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thusundermining democracy.",
publisher = "Prague : Sciendo",
journal = "Politics in Central Europe",
title = "Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe",
pages = "643-621",
number = "3",
volume = "19",
doi = "10.2478/pce-2023-0029"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2023). Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe. in Politics in Central Europe
Prague : Sciendo., 19(3), 621-643.
https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0029

Pavlović D. Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe. in Politics in Central Europe. 2023;19(3):621-643.
doi:10.2478/pce-2023-0029 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe" in Politics in Central Europe, 19, no. 3 (2023):621-643,
https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0029 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Tomić, Slobodan
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1055
AB  - This paper examines the model of party patronage in Serbia and its impact on the professionalisation of public administration. Drawing on case studies of the appointment and subsequent performance of heads of three prominent public organisations – the National Bank of Serbia, the Anti-Corruption Agency, and the Electro Industry of Serbia – we demonstrate that, despite efforts to implement the Weberian principle of “neutral competence”, which involves the prevalence of meritocracy over partisan affiliation, patronage in Serbia has not only persisted but has become more overt and invasive. The given model of patronage involves the pursuit of multiple functions of partisan patronage – resource extraction, partisan campaigning (including through clientelism), and policy control. We suggest that this model results in the appointment of unqualified individuals to top positions, leading to poor governance and low efficiency of public institutions. The findings point to a “reform reversal” scenario, which departs from the trajectory of mild progress or stagnation usually observed in other cases across post-communist Europe that follow the adoption of Weberian standards. As a conceptual contribution, the paper develops a typology, centered around the question of perniciousness of various patronage models, that captures patronage models and trajectories of anti-patronage developments in a more nuanced manner than the existing frameworks that compare patronage patterns.
PB  - Warsaw : De Gruyter
T2  - NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy
T1  - Blatant, not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia
IS  - 1
SP  - 181
VL  - 16
VL  - 209
DO  - 10.2478/nispa-2023-0008
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Tomić, Slobodan",
year = "2023",
abstract = "This paper examines the model of party patronage in Serbia and its impact on the professionalisation of public administration. Drawing on case studies of the appointment and subsequent performance of heads of three prominent public organisations – the National Bank of Serbia, the Anti-Corruption Agency, and the Electro Industry of Serbia – we demonstrate that, despite efforts to implement the Weberian principle of “neutral competence”, which involves the prevalence of meritocracy over partisan affiliation, patronage in Serbia has not only persisted but has become more overt and invasive. The given model of patronage involves the pursuit of multiple functions of partisan patronage – resource extraction, partisan campaigning (including through clientelism), and policy control. We suggest that this model results in the appointment of unqualified individuals to top positions, leading to poor governance and low efficiency of public institutions. The findings point to a “reform reversal” scenario, which departs from the trajectory of mild progress or stagnation usually observed in other cases across post-communist Europe that follow the adoption of Weberian standards. As a conceptual contribution, the paper develops a typology, centered around the question of perniciousness of various patronage models, that captures patronage models and trajectories of anti-patronage developments in a more nuanced manner than the existing frameworks that compare patronage patterns.",
publisher = "Warsaw : De Gruyter",
journal = "NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy",
title = "Blatant, not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia",
number = "1",
pages = "181",
volume = "16, 209",
doi = "10.2478/nispa-2023-0008"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Tomić, S.. (2023). Blatant, not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia. in NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy
Warsaw : De Gruyter., 16(1), 181.
https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008

Pavlović D, Tomić S. Blatant, not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia. in NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy. 2023;16(1):181.
doi:10.2478/nispa-2023-0008 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Tomić, Slobodan, "Blatant, not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia" in NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 16, no. 1 (2023):181,
https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Đurašković, Stevo
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/838
AB  - We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian
Cabinet and the Yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs
from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical
(rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the Receiver is satisfied with
any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game
theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction
in the Receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe
this behavior in the emotional behavior of Frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the
leaders of the Yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum
game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić who
opposed any concessions to the Yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum
to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was
harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces
two conclusions. First, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt
themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.
PB  - Hrvatsko politološko društvo
T2  - Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju
T1  - The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918
EP  - 368
IS  - 1
SP  - 345
VL  - 18
DO  - 10.20901/an.18.15
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Đurašković, Stevo",
year = "2021",
abstract = "We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian
Cabinet and the Yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs
from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical
(rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the Receiver is satisfied with
any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game
theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction
in the Receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe
this behavior in the emotional behavior of Frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the
leaders of the Yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum
game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić who
opposed any concessions to the Yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum
to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was
harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces
two conclusions. First, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt
themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.",
publisher = "Hrvatsko politološko društvo",
journal = "Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju",
title = "The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918",
pages = "368-345",
number = "1",
volume = "18",
doi = "10.20901/an.18.15"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Đurašković, S.. (2021). The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918. in Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju
Hrvatsko politološko društvo., 18(1), 345-368.
https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.15

Pavlović D, Đurašković S. The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918. in Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju. 2021;18(1):345-368.
doi:10.20901/an.18.15 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Đurašković, Stevo, "The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918" in Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju, 18, no. 1 (2021):345-368,
https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.15 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/791
PB  - Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
T2  - East European Politics
T1  - The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans
EP  - 464
IS  - 3
SP  - 463
VL  - 36
DO  - 10.1080/21599165.2020.1780425
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2020",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
journal = "East European Politics",
title = "The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans",
pages = "464-463",
number = "3",
volume = "36",
doi = "10.1080/21599165.2020.1780425"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2020). The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. in East European Politics
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group., 36(3), 463-464.
https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1780425

Pavlović D. The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. in East European Politics. 2020;36(3):463-464.
doi:10.1080/21599165.2020.1780425 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans" in East European Politics, 36, no. 3 (2020):463-464,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1780425 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/790
AB  - Why would a large incumbent party, that can by itself muster more than 45 per cent of electoral support, add seven insignificant political parties to its electoral list, thus providing them with a free ticket into the Assembly, state-sponsored financing for the next four years, and an independent deputy club in the Assembly? More importantly, why would the incumbent party, as a consequence of this deliberate decision, end up without parliamentary majority? In this article, I discuss less frequently mentioned aspects of institutional design that can help us understand why the incumbent party makes such decisions and why a party system in a hybrid regime has a large number of parties. I offer qualitative evidence from the postcommunist Serbia (1990-2018). The first two aspects refer to electoral design (but not the electoral formula or district magnitude): a larger number of parties under the incumbent party's control provides stronger political influence in the Republican Electoral Commission and at polling stations on election day. In hybrid regimes, the incumbent party is interested in this influence because it can use it to arrange electoral fraud. The third aspect relates to parliamentary design: more parties in the Serbian Assembly under the incumbent party's control secure more minutes on the floor for the incumbent party during parliamentary debate.
PB  - Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks
T2  - East European Politics and Societies
T1  - How Political Parties in Hybrid Regimes Help the Incumbent Maintain a Democratic Facade
DO  - 10.1177/0888325420941101
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Why would a large incumbent party, that can by itself muster more than 45 per cent of electoral support, add seven insignificant political parties to its electoral list, thus providing them with a free ticket into the Assembly, state-sponsored financing for the next four years, and an independent deputy club in the Assembly? More importantly, why would the incumbent party, as a consequence of this deliberate decision, end up without parliamentary majority? In this article, I discuss less frequently mentioned aspects of institutional design that can help us understand why the incumbent party makes such decisions and why a party system in a hybrid regime has a large number of parties. I offer qualitative evidence from the postcommunist Serbia (1990-2018). The first two aspects refer to electoral design (but not the electoral formula or district magnitude): a larger number of parties under the incumbent party's control provides stronger political influence in the Republican Electoral Commission and at polling stations on election day. In hybrid regimes, the incumbent party is interested in this influence because it can use it to arrange electoral fraud. The third aspect relates to parliamentary design: more parties in the Serbian Assembly under the incumbent party's control secure more minutes on the floor for the incumbent party during parliamentary debate.",
publisher = "Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks",
journal = "East European Politics and Societies",
title = "How Political Parties in Hybrid Regimes Help the Incumbent Maintain a Democratic Facade",
doi = "10.1177/0888325420941101"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2020). How Political Parties in Hybrid Regimes Help the Incumbent Maintain a Democratic Facade. in East European Politics and Societies
Sage Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks..
https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325420941101

Pavlović D. How Political Parties in Hybrid Regimes Help the Incumbent Maintain a Democratic Facade. in East European Politics and Societies. 2020;.
doi:10.1177/0888325420941101 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "How Political Parties in Hybrid Regimes Help the Incumbent Maintain a Democratic Facade" in East European Politics and Societies (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325420941101 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/781
PB  - Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
T2  - Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
T1  - The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A failure of EU conditionality?
EP  - 241
IS  - 1
SP  - 240
VL  - 20
DO  - 10.1080/14683857.2019.1692439
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2020",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
journal = "Southeast European and Black Sea Studies",
title = "The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A failure of EU conditionality?",
pages = "241-240",
number = "1",
volume = "20",
doi = "10.1080/14683857.2019.1692439"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2020). The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A failure of EU conditionality?. in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group., 20(1), 240-241.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1692439

Pavlović D. The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A failure of EU conditionality?. in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 2020;20(1):240-241.
doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1692439 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A failure of EU conditionality?" in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20, no. 1 (2020):240-241,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1692439 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/778
AB  - This paper aims to accomplish two goals. First, to present recent empirical evidence supporting the claim that Serbia is on the path towards embracing a more radical version of electoral authoritarianism. This is accomplished by examining most recent illiberal politics aimed at controlling electoral processes and the media sphere, and extracting public funds for partisan purposes. I claim that the incomplete design of democratic institutions in Serbia set up between 2001 and 2012 is primarily responsible for the democratic decline. The second goal is more general and aims to emphasize the importance of extracting public funds for hybrid regimes. Extractive institutions matter because they directly impact other critical segments of electoral authoritarianism (notably, elections and media freedom), but also because they explain the type of leadership they promote in politics. If public resources remain without proper institutional oversight and are simply 'up for grabs,' this will attract leaders more willing to dismantle democratic institutions and violate democratic procedures. Serbia serves as a good and current example of this linkage.
PB  - Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
T2  - Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
T1  - The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia
EP  - 39
IS  - 1
SP  - 19
VL  - 20
DO  - 10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2020",
abstract = "This paper aims to accomplish two goals. First, to present recent empirical evidence supporting the claim that Serbia is on the path towards embracing a more radical version of electoral authoritarianism. This is accomplished by examining most recent illiberal politics aimed at controlling electoral processes and the media sphere, and extracting public funds for partisan purposes. I claim that the incomplete design of democratic institutions in Serbia set up between 2001 and 2012 is primarily responsible for the democratic decline. The second goal is more general and aims to emphasize the importance of extracting public funds for hybrid regimes. Extractive institutions matter because they directly impact other critical segments of electoral authoritarianism (notably, elections and media freedom), but also because they explain the type of leadership they promote in politics. If public resources remain without proper institutional oversight and are simply 'up for grabs,' this will attract leaders more willing to dismantle democratic institutions and violate democratic procedures. Serbia serves as a good and current example of this linkage.",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
journal = "Southeast European and Black Sea Studies",
title = "The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia",
pages = "39-19",
number = "1",
volume = "20",
doi = "10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2020). The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia. in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group., 20(1), 19-39.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929

Pavlović D. The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia. in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 2020;20(1):19-39.
doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia" in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20, no. 1 (2020):19-39,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Xefteris, Dimitros
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/770
AB  - Under what circumstances do coalition partners tend to overspend? The so-far dominant explanation relies on the common pool resource theory-the more cabinet members there are, the higher the spending. While theoretically sound, this explanation seems to be more relevant for some cases and less for others. What could lie behind this discrepancy? While the literature to date has focused on institutional factors, we propose a mechanism that relates to voting behaviour. Relying on the concept of positional externalities, we argue that each coalition member wishes to spend relatively more resources than the other coalition member(s) to attract impressionable voters. Positional externalities, we claim, exhibit a direct positive effect on total spending and, perhaps more importantly, interact with the common pool resource factor, decreasing its relevance when they are weak.
PB  - Springer, New York
T2  - Constitutional Political Economy
T1  - Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities
EP  - 457
IS  - 4
SP  - 446
VL  - 31
DO  - 10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Xefteris, Dimitros",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Under what circumstances do coalition partners tend to overspend? The so-far dominant explanation relies on the common pool resource theory-the more cabinet members there are, the higher the spending. While theoretically sound, this explanation seems to be more relevant for some cases and less for others. What could lie behind this discrepancy? While the literature to date has focused on institutional factors, we propose a mechanism that relates to voting behaviour. Relying on the concept of positional externalities, we argue that each coalition member wishes to spend relatively more resources than the other coalition member(s) to attract impressionable voters. Positional externalities, we claim, exhibit a direct positive effect on total spending and, perhaps more importantly, interact with the common pool resource factor, decreasing its relevance when they are weak.",
publisher = "Springer, New York",
journal = "Constitutional Political Economy",
title = "Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities",
pages = "457-446",
number = "4",
volume = "31",
doi = "10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Xefteris, D.. (2020). Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities. in Constitutional Political Economy
Springer, New York., 31(4), 446-457.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6

Pavlović D, Xefteris D. Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities. in Constitutional Political Economy. 2020;31(4):446-457.
doi:10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Xefteris, Dimitros, "Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities" in Constitutional Political Economy, 31, no. 4 (2020):446-457,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09306-6 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Bešić, Miloš Lj.
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/763
AB  - Do political factors have any effect on fiscal policy and public spending in the post-communist Europe? We answer this question by using annual data for 15 Central and Eastern European democracies from 1992-2017. We look into several political variables: number of parties in the cabinet, partisan cycle (ideology), electoral cycle, and coalition type. We deploy fixed-effect estimates, showing that the peculiarities of a country explain a large part of the variance, thus validating the path dependency and incrementalism theses in public policy analysis. We find positive impact of the pre-electoral and electoral year on public spending, but no statistically significant support for other poitical determinats.
PB  - Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
T2  - East European Politics
T1  - Political institutions and fiscal policy: evidence from post-communist Europe
EP  - 237
IS  - 2
SP  - 220
VL  - 35
DO  - 10.1080/21599165.2019.1594786
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Bešić, Miloš Lj.",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Do political factors have any effect on fiscal policy and public spending in the post-communist Europe? We answer this question by using annual data for 15 Central and Eastern European democracies from 1992-2017. We look into several political variables: number of parties in the cabinet, partisan cycle (ideology), electoral cycle, and coalition type. We deploy fixed-effect estimates, showing that the peculiarities of a country explain a large part of the variance, thus validating the path dependency and incrementalism theses in public policy analysis. We find positive impact of the pre-electoral and electoral year on public spending, but no statistically significant support for other poitical determinats.",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
journal = "East European Politics",
title = "Political institutions and fiscal policy: evidence from post-communist Europe",
pages = "237-220",
number = "2",
volume = "35",
doi = "10.1080/21599165.2019.1594786"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Bešić, M. Lj.. (2019). Political institutions and fiscal policy: evidence from post-communist Europe. in East European Politics
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group., 35(2), 220-237.
https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1594786

Pavlović D, Bešić ML. Political institutions and fiscal policy: evidence from post-communist Europe. in East European Politics. 2019;35(2):220-237.
doi:10.1080/21599165.2019.1594786 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Bešić, Miloš Lj., "Political institutions and fiscal policy: evidence from post-communist Europe" in East European Politics, 35, no. 2 (2019):220-237,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1594786 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/733
AB  - I apply game theory to economic problems in large groups (more than two players). I focus on the coordination problem of collective action within assurance game. Coordinative failure in such games is a consequence of the expectation concerning what the other players will do. The prevailing pessimism about the actions of others creates "bad equilibrium," while the prevailing optimism about the actions of others creates "good equilibrium." I look into three examples: students' self-grading, fiscal stimulus, and the absence of investments in undeveloped economies. The main insight is that the coordination failure problem may be solved by state intervention - by way of fiscal stimulus or coordination agent who creates a focal point among consumers and producers.
AB  - U ovom tekstu primenjujem teoriju igara na ekonomske probleme u velikim grupama (više od dva igrača). Fokusiram se na problem koordinacije kolek-tivnog delanja unutar igre uveravanja. koordinacioni nedostaci u nekoj ko-lektivnoj radnji proizvod su očekivanja o tome šta će uraditi druge osobe. Pesimizam o radnjama drugih stvara "lošu" ravnotežu, dok optimizam stva-ra "dobru" ravnotežu. igru analiziram na tri primera: studentsko samooce-njivanje, fiskalni podsticaj i odsustvo investicija u nerazvijenim privredama. glavni zaključak je da problem koordinacionih nedostataka može da se reši državnom intervencijom-fiskalnim podsticajima ili koordinacionim telom koje stvara fokalnu tačku za potrošače i proizvođače.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
T1  - Assurance game in large groups: Economic examples
T1  - Igra uveravanja u velikim grupama - ekonomski primeri
EP  - 171
IS  - 21
SP  - 153
VL  - 13
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_733
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2019",
abstract = "I apply game theory to economic problems in large groups (more than two players). I focus on the coordination problem of collective action within assurance game. Coordinative failure in such games is a consequence of the expectation concerning what the other players will do. The prevailing pessimism about the actions of others creates "bad equilibrium," while the prevailing optimism about the actions of others creates "good equilibrium." I look into three examples: students' self-grading, fiscal stimulus, and the absence of investments in undeveloped economies. The main insight is that the coordination failure problem may be solved by state intervention - by way of fiscal stimulus or coordination agent who creates a focal point among consumers and producers., U ovom tekstu primenjujem teoriju igara na ekonomske probleme u velikim grupama (više od dva igrača). Fokusiram se na problem koordinacije kolek-tivnog delanja unutar igre uveravanja. koordinacioni nedostaci u nekoj ko-lektivnoj radnji proizvod su očekivanja o tome šta će uraditi druge osobe. Pesimizam o radnjama drugih stvara "lošu" ravnotežu, dok optimizam stva-ra "dobru" ravnotežu. igru analiziram na tri primera: studentsko samooce-njivanje, fiskalni podsticaj i odsustvo investicija u nerazvijenim privredama. glavni zaključak je da problem koordinacionih nedostataka može da se reši državnom intervencijom-fiskalnim podsticajima ili koordinacionim telom koje stvara fokalnu tačku za potrošače i proizvođače.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka",
title = "Assurance game in large groups: Economic examples, Igra uveravanja u velikim grupama - ekonomski primeri",
pages = "171-153",
number = "21",
volume = "13",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_733"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2019). Assurance game in large groups: Economic examples. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd., 13(21), 153-171.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_733

Pavlović D. Assurance game in large groups: Economic examples. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka. 2019;13(21):153-171.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_733 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Assurance game in large groups: Economic examples" in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 13, no. 21 (2019):153-171,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_733 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/716
AB  - Do neoliberal reforms (notably, austerity policy) facilitate democratic decline and the gradual deconstruction of democratic institutions? I examine the democratic development of the Western Balkan countries since 2008 by focusing on the two most recent cases of democratic rollback in Macedonia and Serbia. Neoliberal reforms may create a preference to shut down democratic institutions, because such reforms are socially costly and politically risky. However, democratic backsliding is not possible without opportunity. I illustrate this with reference to the examples of Hungary and Croatia. Croatia implemented some neoliberal policies after 2015, but did not see a drop in its democracy score. By contrast, Hungary moved towards centrally planned capitalism, nationalisation and state interventionism (all opposed to the neoliberal concept of reform), and yet saw a significant democratic decline after 2010. The opportunity to dismantle democratic institutions was a consequence of an electoral gap (a difference in vote share between former and new incumbents), which enabled the rise of authoritarian leaders in Macedonia, Hungary and Serbia.
PB  - Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
T2  - POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES
T1  - When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe
EP  - 697
IS  - 5
SP  - 671
VL  - 31
DO  - 10.1080/14631377.2019.1607436
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Do neoliberal reforms (notably, austerity policy) facilitate democratic decline and the gradual deconstruction of democratic institutions? I examine the democratic development of the Western Balkan countries since 2008 by focusing on the two most recent cases of democratic rollback in Macedonia and Serbia. Neoliberal reforms may create a preference to shut down democratic institutions, because such reforms are socially costly and politically risky. However, democratic backsliding is not possible without opportunity. I illustrate this with reference to the examples of Hungary and Croatia. Croatia implemented some neoliberal policies after 2015, but did not see a drop in its democracy score. By contrast, Hungary moved towards centrally planned capitalism, nationalisation and state interventionism (all opposed to the neoliberal concept of reform), and yet saw a significant democratic decline after 2010. The opportunity to dismantle democratic institutions was a consequence of an electoral gap (a difference in vote share between former and new incumbents), which enabled the rise of authoritarian leaders in Macedonia, Hungary and Serbia.",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",
journal = "POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES",
title = "When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe",
pages = "697-671",
number = "5",
volume = "31",
doi = "10.1080/14631377.2019.1607436"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2019). When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe. in POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group., 31(5), 671-697.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2019.1607436

Pavlović D. When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe. in POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES. 2019;31(5):671-697.
doi:10.1080/14631377.2019.1607436 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe" in POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, 31, no. 5 (2019):671-697,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2019.1607436 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/712
AB  - Why do presidents in semi-presidential regimes sometimes call early elections? Is the behavior of incumbent presidents different from the behavior of presidential contenders when the former do not need to run for office but face the loss of parliamentary majority in a semi-presidential system? Prospect theory claims that agents make risky choices when facing a loss. Consequently, if incumbent presidents face a loss of majority in the parliament, they will call for early election to try to shore up or salvage the majority. To provide empirical evidence supporting this claim, prospect theory has been applied to the two presidential elections in Yugoslavia and Serbia in which two incumbent presidents, Slobodan Milosevic (2000) and Boris Tadic (2012), had lost early presidential elections. The expected contribution of the paper is to deepen our understanding of how semi presidential regimes resolve the problem of temporal rigidity and offer novel empirical data in support of the application of prospect theory in political science. (C) 2019 The Regents of the University of California.
PB  - Elsevier Sci Ltd, Oxford
T2  - Communist and Post-Communist Studies
T1  - Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia
EP  - 24
IS  - 1
SP  - 11
VL  - 52
DO  - 10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.01.002
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Why do presidents in semi-presidential regimes sometimes call early elections? Is the behavior of incumbent presidents different from the behavior of presidential contenders when the former do not need to run for office but face the loss of parliamentary majority in a semi-presidential system? Prospect theory claims that agents make risky choices when facing a loss. Consequently, if incumbent presidents face a loss of majority in the parliament, they will call for early election to try to shore up or salvage the majority. To provide empirical evidence supporting this claim, prospect theory has been applied to the two presidential elections in Yugoslavia and Serbia in which two incumbent presidents, Slobodan Milosevic (2000) and Boris Tadic (2012), had lost early presidential elections. The expected contribution of the paper is to deepen our understanding of how semi presidential regimes resolve the problem of temporal rigidity and offer novel empirical data in support of the application of prospect theory in political science. (C) 2019 The Regents of the University of California.",
publisher = "Elsevier Sci Ltd, Oxford",
journal = "Communist and Post-Communist Studies",
title = "Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia",
pages = "24-11",
number = "1",
volume = "52",
doi = "10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.01.002"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2019). Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia. in Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Elsevier Sci Ltd, Oxford., 52(1), 11-24.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.01.002

Pavlović D. Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia. in Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2019;52(1):11-24.
doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.01.002 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia" in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 52, no. 1 (2019):11-24,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.01.002 . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Kapidžić, D.
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Bosanac, G.
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/690
AB  - The institutional design of crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia determined those countries' responses to the 2014 floods. In all three cases a weak institutional framework and deficient communication, coordination and cooperation severely limited the efficiency of crisis response. Even though the floods affected the broader region, there was no coordinated response between the countries. This was aggravated by the scale of the floods, the rareness of such an event - best described as a black swan event - and the lack of adequate measures to prepare for such an occurrence. The resulting patchwork of institutional responses had its own deficiencies and faults. We identify three common issues: a prevalent lack of effective communication between response actors and institutions through formal channels, a lack of substantial investment in water management and civil protection systems and the absence of responsibility after flooding. There were also differences between cases, especially regarding institutional learning and adaptation. Yet, the floods produced some insights at the strategic level of political officeholders, confirming bad governance in Southeast Europe.
PB  - Peter Lang AG
T2  - Crisis Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia: The Study of Floods in 2014
T1  - Crisis response in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia
EP  - 58
SP  - 27
DO  - 10.3726/b13392
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Kapidžić, D. and Pavlović, Dušan and Bosanac, G.",
year = "2018",
abstract = "The institutional design of crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia determined those countries' responses to the 2014 floods. In all three cases a weak institutional framework and deficient communication, coordination and cooperation severely limited the efficiency of crisis response. Even though the floods affected the broader region, there was no coordinated response between the countries. This was aggravated by the scale of the floods, the rareness of such an event - best described as a black swan event - and the lack of adequate measures to prepare for such an occurrence. The resulting patchwork of institutional responses had its own deficiencies and faults. We identify three common issues: a prevalent lack of effective communication between response actors and institutions through formal channels, a lack of substantial investment in water management and civil protection systems and the absence of responsibility after flooding. There were also differences between cases, especially regarding institutional learning and adaptation. Yet, the floods produced some insights at the strategic level of political officeholders, confirming bad governance in Southeast Europe.",
publisher = "Peter Lang AG",
journal = "Crisis Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia: The Study of Floods in 2014",
booktitle = "Crisis response in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia",
pages = "58-27",
doi = "10.3726/b13392"
}

Kapidžić, D., Pavlović, D.,& Bosanac, G.. (2018). Crisis response in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. in Crisis Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia: The Study of Floods in 2014
Peter Lang AG., 27-58.
https://doi.org/10.3726/b13392

Kapidžić D, Pavlović D, Bosanac G. Crisis response in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. in Crisis Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia: The Study of Floods in 2014. 2018;:27-58.
doi:10.3726/b13392 .

Kapidžić, D., Pavlović, Dušan, Bosanac, G., "Crisis response in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia" in Crisis Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia: The Study of Floods in 2014 (2018):27-58,
https://doi.org/10.3726/b13392 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/537
AB  - For a long time, political theorists who deployed game theory have believed that Hobbes's state of nature can be expressed as a Prisoner's dilemma in which war of all against all is a Pareto-inferior outcome of social cooperation. Some recent game theory studies have looked at the state of nature from a perspective of chicken game and assurance game. Assurance game seems to be more precise in explaining how individuals in Hobbes's state of nature overcome the conflict and establish cooperation. In assurance game, cooperation is established by credible signaling that assures other players that everyone is prepared to cooperate. If all players do the same, and they all know it, individuals can achieve a Pareto-superior outcome.
AB  - Politički teoretičari su dugo smatrali da Hobsovo prirodno stanje može da se objasni zatvorenikovom dilemom u kojoj rat svih protiv sviju predstavlja Pareto-inferioran ishod društvene saradnje. Nedavni radovi teoretičari igara analizirali su prirodno stanje iz ugla igre kukavice i igre uveravanja (assurance game). Pokazalo se da igra uveravanja preciznije objašnjava način na koji pojedinci prevazilaze sukob u prirodnom stanju i uspostavljaju saradnju. U ovoj igri, suština prevazilaženja sukoba predstavlja kredibilno signaliziranje kojim drugu stranu uveravate da ste spremni na saradnju. Ako pojedinci ispune taj uslov, i znaju da su ga svi drugi ispunili, moguć je prelazak iz Pareto-inferiornog u Pareto-optimalno stanje.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
T1  - Game theory in Hobbes's Leviathan
T1  - Teorija igara u Levijatanu Tomasa Hobsa
EP  - 150
IS  - 13
SP  - 135
VL  - 9
DO  - 10.5937/GodFPN1513135P
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2015",
abstract = "For a long time, political theorists who deployed game theory have believed that Hobbes's state of nature can be expressed as a Prisoner's dilemma in which war of all against all is a Pareto-inferior outcome of social cooperation. Some recent game theory studies have looked at the state of nature from a perspective of chicken game and assurance game. Assurance game seems to be more precise in explaining how individuals in Hobbes's state of nature overcome the conflict and establish cooperation. In assurance game, cooperation is established by credible signaling that assures other players that everyone is prepared to cooperate. If all players do the same, and they all know it, individuals can achieve a Pareto-superior outcome., Politički teoretičari su dugo smatrali da Hobsovo prirodno stanje može da se objasni zatvorenikovom dilemom u kojoj rat svih protiv sviju predstavlja Pareto-inferioran ishod društvene saradnje. Nedavni radovi teoretičari igara analizirali su prirodno stanje iz ugla igre kukavice i igre uveravanja (assurance game). Pokazalo se da igra uveravanja preciznije objašnjava način na koji pojedinci prevazilaze sukob u prirodnom stanju i uspostavljaju saradnju. U ovoj igri, suština prevazilaženja sukoba predstavlja kredibilno signaliziranje kojim drugu stranu uveravate da ste spremni na saradnju. Ako pojedinci ispune taj uslov, i znaju da su ga svi drugi ispunili, moguć je prelazak iz Pareto-inferiornog u Pareto-optimalno stanje.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka",
title = "Game theory in Hobbes's Leviathan, Teorija igara u Levijatanu Tomasa Hobsa",
pages = "150-135",
number = "13",
volume = "9",
doi = "10.5937/GodFPN1513135P"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2015). Game theory in Hobbes's Leviathan. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd., 9(13), 135-150.
https://doi.org/10.5937/GodFPN1513135P

Pavlović D. Game theory in Hobbes's Leviathan. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka. 2015;9(13):135-150.
doi:10.5937/GodFPN1513135P .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Game theory in Hobbes's Leviathan" in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 9, no. 13 (2015):135-150,
https://doi.org/10.5937/GodFPN1513135P . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/471
PB  - Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia
T2  - Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva
T1  - Moral foundations of contemporary liberalism
EP  - 41
IS  - 1
SP  - 27
VL  - 11
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_471
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia",
journal = "Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva",
title = "Moral foundations of contemporary liberalism",
pages = "41-27",
number = "1",
volume = "11",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_471"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2014). Moral foundations of contemporary liberalism. in Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva
Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia., 11(1), 27-41.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_471

Pavlović D. Moral foundations of contemporary liberalism. in Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva. 2014;11(1):27-41.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_471 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Moral foundations of contemporary liberalism" in Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva, 11, no. 1 (2014):27-41,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_471 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Urošević, Branko
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/434
AB  - The paper explains why the quality of social research in Serbia is low. We show that low international competitiveness of the Serbian social science research can be found in the system of perverse incentives that rewards social scientists to put minimal effort to advance on academic ladder and do the research. This can be seen in small number of works and papers published in internationally recognized and prestigious academic journals and rare participation at international conferences and gatherings. Low competitiveness is a consequence of descriptivity in research; retelling other author's theories, avoidance of quantitative research; rare application of theoretical paradigms; misunder­standing of theories, recycling of one's own but also other's works, usage of old syllabi in teaching, and a perverse system of teacher selection that is de­signed to select average students for TAs and university professors. We offer several recommendation to improve the situation.
AB  - U tekstu objašnjavamo zbog čega je kvalitet naučno-istraživačkog rada u društvenim naukama u Srbiji, i pored jednog broja izuzetnih pojedinaca, u proseku na relativno niskom nivou, kao i šta bi trebalo preduzeti da bi se to promenilo. Smatramo da se glavni razlog za nisku međunarodnu konkurentnost domaćih istraživanja i istraživača u društvenim naukama nalazi u nedovoljno podsticajnom sistemu nagrađivanja i promovisanja naučnih radnika i naučnog rada. Konkurentnost je niska, jer sistem ne podstiče domaće istraživače da proizvode kvalitetna istraživanja, objavljuju u kvalitetnim stranim časopisima i prestižnim međunarodnim monografijama, i učestvuju na vrhunskim međunarodnim konferencijama. Niska konkurentnost je ključna, jer predstavlja uzrok niza drugih problema u društvenim naukama u koje spadaju: deskriptivnost u istraživanju; izbegavanje kvantitativnih istraživanja i praktične primene teorijskih paradigmi; nedovoljno razumevanje teorije; recikliranje sopstvenih, ali i tuđih radova; zastarelost u nastavnim planovima i programima kako na redovnim, tako i na poslediplomskim studijama itd. Posle analize postojećeg stanja, tekst završavamo preporukama o tome kako da se situacija poboljša.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Političke perspektive
T1  - Istraživanja u društvenim naukama u Srbiji posle 1990. godine
EP  - 128
IS  - 2
SP  - 103
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_434
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Urošević, Branko and Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2013",
abstract = "The paper explains why the quality of social research in Serbia is low. We show that low international competitiveness of the Serbian social science research can be found in the system of perverse incentives that rewards social scientists to put minimal effort to advance on academic ladder and do the research. This can be seen in small number of works and papers published in internationally recognized and prestigious academic journals and rare participation at international conferences and gatherings. Low competitiveness is a consequence of descriptivity in research; retelling other author's theories, avoidance of quantitative research; rare application of theoretical paradigms; misunder­standing of theories, recycling of one's own but also other's works, usage of old syllabi in teaching, and a perverse system of teacher selection that is de­signed to select average students for TAs and university professors. We offer several recommendation to improve the situation., U tekstu objašnjavamo zbog čega je kvalitet naučno-istraživačkog rada u društvenim naukama u Srbiji, i pored jednog broja izuzetnih pojedinaca, u proseku na relativno niskom nivou, kao i šta bi trebalo preduzeti da bi se to promenilo. Smatramo da se glavni razlog za nisku međunarodnu konkurentnost domaćih istraživanja i istraživača u društvenim naukama nalazi u nedovoljno podsticajnom sistemu nagrađivanja i promovisanja naučnih radnika i naučnog rada. Konkurentnost je niska, jer sistem ne podstiče domaće istraživače da proizvode kvalitetna istraživanja, objavljuju u kvalitetnim stranim časopisima i prestižnim međunarodnim monografijama, i učestvuju na vrhunskim međunarodnim konferencijama. Niska konkurentnost je ključna, jer predstavlja uzrok niza drugih problema u društvenim naukama u koje spadaju: deskriptivnost u istraživanju; izbegavanje kvantitativnih istraživanja i praktične primene teorijskih paradigmi; nedovoljno razumevanje teorije; recikliranje sopstvenih, ali i tuđih radova; zastarelost u nastavnim planovima i programima kako na redovnim, tako i na poslediplomskim studijama itd. Posle analize postojećeg stanja, tekst završavamo preporukama o tome kako da se situacija poboljša.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Političke perspektive",
title = "Istraživanja u društvenim naukama u Srbiji posle 1990. godine",
pages = "128-103",
number = "2",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_434"
}

Urošević, B.,& Pavlović, D.. (2013). Istraživanja u društvenim naukama u Srbiji posle 1990. godine. in Političke perspektive
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd.(2), 103-128.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_434

Urošević B, Pavlović D. Istraživanja u društvenim naukama u Srbiji posle 1990. godine. in Političke perspektive. 2013;(2):103-128.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_434 .

Urošević, Branko, Pavlović, Dušan, "Istraživanja u društvenim naukama u Srbiji posle 1990. godine" in Političke perspektive, no. 2 (2013):103-128,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_434 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Stanojević, Ivan N.
PY  - 2012
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/365
AB  - The article is the second part of the study the examines how political institutions affect economics policy notably, fiscal policy (the first part of the article was printed in the previous volume of Godišnjak FPN). In this part, we give results for the remaining four indicators that make up the power index - executive flexibility during execution, sufficient time for scrutiny and discussion, assembly committee capacity, and access to budgetary information. In the end of the article we put our findings in the comparative perspective.
AB  - Tekst predstavlja drugi deo naše studije o empirijskoj analizi zakona koji regulišu odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela u vođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike (prvi deo štampan je u prethodnom broj Godišnjaka FPN). U drugom delu iznosimo rezultate vezane za četiri preostala empirijska indikatora koji čine indeks moći - fleksibilnost izvršne vlasti tokom izvršenja budžeta, vreme za podnošenje budžeta i vreme za raspravu, kapacitet skupštinskih odbora, pristup informacijama o budžetu. Na kraju teksta rezultate, dobijene našim istraživanjem, stavljamo u uporednu perspektivu.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
T1  - Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings (2)
T1  - Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi (2)
EP  - 23
IS  - 7
SP  - 7
VL  - 6
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_365
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Stanojević, Ivan N.",
year = "2012",
abstract = "The article is the second part of the study the examines how political institutions affect economics policy notably, fiscal policy (the first part of the article was printed in the previous volume of Godišnjak FPN). In this part, we give results for the remaining four indicators that make up the power index - executive flexibility during execution, sufficient time for scrutiny and discussion, assembly committee capacity, and access to budgetary information. In the end of the article we put our findings in the comparative perspective., Tekst predstavlja drugi deo naše studije o empirijskoj analizi zakona koji regulišu odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela u vođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike (prvi deo štampan je u prethodnom broj Godišnjaka FPN). U drugom delu iznosimo rezultate vezane za četiri preostala empirijska indikatora koji čine indeks moći - fleksibilnost izvršne vlasti tokom izvršenja budžeta, vreme za podnošenje budžeta i vreme za raspravu, kapacitet skupštinskih odbora, pristup informacijama o budžetu. Na kraju teksta rezultate, dobijene našim istraživanjem, stavljamo u uporednu perspektivu.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka",
title = "Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings (2), Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi (2)",
pages = "23-7",
number = "7",
volume = "6",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_365"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Stanojević, I. N.. (2012). Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings (2). in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd., 6(7), 7-23.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_365

Pavlović D, Stanojević IN. Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings (2). in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka. 2012;6(7):7-23.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_365 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Stanojević, Ivan N., "Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings (2)" in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 6, no. 7 (2012):7-23,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_365 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Stanojević, Ivan N.
PY  - 2011
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/334
AB  - The paper is an extension of our study on analysis of laws regulating relations between parliament and executive body in carrying out economic, particularly fiscal policy. This time, the influence of parliament to fiscal policy is measured empirically. In difference from results of the previous study, which showed that the Assembly exercised a relatively high influence to fiscal policy, here we show that the situation in practice is opposite the Government of Serbia has large power in carrying out fiscal policy, where as the influence of the Assembly of Serbia is negligible. The influence of legislative body is measured through analysis of two (out of six) indicators - power of submission of amendment sand budget reversion.
AB  - Tekst predstavlja nastavak naše studije o analizi zakona koji uređuju odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela uvođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike. Ovoga puta uticaj parlamenta na fiskalnu politiku merimo empirijski. Za razliku od rezultata iz prethodne studije, gde se pokazalo da Skupština ima relativno veliki uticaj na fiskalnu politiku, ovde pokazujemo da je u praksi situacija obrnuta - Vlada Srbije ima veliku moć u vođenju fiskalne politike, dok Skupština Srbije ima zanemarljivi uticaj. Uticaj zakonodavnog tela merimo kroz analizu dva (od ukupno šest) indikatora-moć podnošenja amandmana i reverzija budžeta.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
T1  - Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings
T1  - Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi
EP  - 194
IS  - 6
SP  - 177
VL  - 5
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_334
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Stanojević, Ivan N.",
year = "2011",
abstract = "The paper is an extension of our study on analysis of laws regulating relations between parliament and executive body in carrying out economic, particularly fiscal policy. This time, the influence of parliament to fiscal policy is measured empirically. In difference from results of the previous study, which showed that the Assembly exercised a relatively high influence to fiscal policy, here we show that the situation in practice is opposite the Government of Serbia has large power in carrying out fiscal policy, where as the influence of the Assembly of Serbia is negligible. The influence of legislative body is measured through analysis of two (out of six) indicators - power of submission of amendment sand budget reversion., Tekst predstavlja nastavak naše studije o analizi zakona koji uređuju odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela uvođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike. Ovoga puta uticaj parlamenta na fiskalnu politiku merimo empirijski. Za razliku od rezultata iz prethodne studije, gde se pokazalo da Skupština ima relativno veliki uticaj na fiskalnu politiku, ovde pokazujemo da je u praksi situacija obrnuta - Vlada Srbije ima veliku moć u vođenju fiskalne politike, dok Skupština Srbije ima zanemarljivi uticaj. Uticaj zakonodavnog tela merimo kroz analizu dva (od ukupno šest) indikatora-moć podnošenja amandmana i reverzija budžeta.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka",
title = "Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings, Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi",
pages = "194-177",
number = "6",
volume = "5",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_334"
}

Pavlović, D.,& Stanojević, I. N.. (2011). Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd., 5(6), 177-194.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_334

Pavlović D, Stanojević IN. Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka. 2011;5(6):177-194.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_334 .

Pavlović, Dušan, Stanojević, Ivan N., "Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings" in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 5, no. 6 (2011):177-194,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_334 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2009
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/207
AB  - The article lays out the current state of the political economy. It begins with the question whether or not political economy is the discipline of political science. Sections 3-5 briefly review the development of political economy prior to the World War 2. Sections 6-8 review the state of the discipline after the World War 2. Section 7 reviews the most important works that grounded the contemporary discipline of political economy, including the works of Black, Downs, Buchanan & Tullock, and Riker. Section 8 reviews main research areas, concepts, and issues of contemporary political economy such as prosoners dilemma and the economic effects of the constitutions.
AB  - Tekst izlaže današnje stanje političke ekonomije, tačnije teorije javnog izbora. Započinje sa pitanjem da li politička ekonomija spada u političku ili ekonomsku nauku. U odeljcima 3-5 iznosi se kratak razvoj političke ekonomije do Drugog svetskog rata. Drugi deo rada (odeljci 6-8) bave se stanjem discipline posle Drugog svetskog rata. U odeljku 7 izlažu se najznačajniji radovi i dela koja su utemeljila savremenu političku ekonomiju. Odeljak 8 govori o oblastima istraživanja i glavnim istraživačkim problemima savremene političke ekonomije.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
T1  - Political economy: The state of the discipline
T1  - Politička ekonomija - stanje discipline
EP  - 199
IS  - 3
SP  - 169
VL  - 3
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_207
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2009",
abstract = "The article lays out the current state of the political economy. It begins with the question whether or not political economy is the discipline of political science. Sections 3-5 briefly review the development of political economy prior to the World War 2. Sections 6-8 review the state of the discipline after the World War 2. Section 7 reviews the most important works that grounded the contemporary discipline of political economy, including the works of Black, Downs, Buchanan & Tullock, and Riker. Section 8 reviews main research areas, concepts, and issues of contemporary political economy such as prosoners dilemma and the economic effects of the constitutions., Tekst izlaže današnje stanje političke ekonomije, tačnije teorije javnog izbora. Započinje sa pitanjem da li politička ekonomija spada u političku ili ekonomsku nauku. U odeljcima 3-5 iznosi se kratak razvoj političke ekonomije do Drugog svetskog rata. Drugi deo rada (odeljci 6-8) bave se stanjem discipline posle Drugog svetskog rata. U odeljku 7 izlažu se najznačajniji radovi i dela koja su utemeljila savremenu političku ekonomiju. Odeljak 8 govori o oblastima istraživanja i glavnim istraživačkim problemima savremene političke ekonomije.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka",
title = "Political economy: The state of the discipline, Politička ekonomija - stanje discipline",
pages = "199-169",
number = "3",
volume = "3",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_207"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2009). Political economy: The state of the discipline. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd., 3(3), 169-199.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_207

Pavlović D. Political economy: The state of the discipline. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka. 2009;3(3):169-199.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_207 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Political economy: The state of the discipline" in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 3, no. 3 (2009):169-199,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_207 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2009
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/197
AB  - The article discusses sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science. Section 1 introduces different types of institutionalism. Section 3 compares the old with the new institutionalism. Since new institutionalism is sociological in nature, section 4 links new institutionalism with social behavior. Section 5 discusses common features of all types of institutionalism. Sections 6-8 lays out main elements of normative institutionalism. Section 9 concludes by highlighting the relevance of new institutionalism for political science. .
AB  - U tekstu se izlažu sociološke osnovne normativnog institucionalizma u političkoj nauci. Najpre se pravi razgraničenje između različitih vrsta institucionalizama. Odeljak 3 poredi novi sa starim institucionalizmom. Budući da novi institucionalizam ima najviše dodira sa sociologijom, u odeljku 4 izlaže se veza novog institucionalizma i društvenog ponašanja. Odeljak 5 objašnjava šta su zajedničke karakteristike svih vrsta institucionalizama, dok se u odeljcima 6-8 izlažu glavni koncepti normativnog institicionalizma. Odeljak 9 zaključuje tekst, ističući značaj novog institucionalizma za savremenu političku nauku.
PB  - Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd
T2  - Sociološki pregled
T1  - Sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science
T1  - Sociološke osnove normativnog institucionalizma u političkoj nauci
EP  - 250
IS  - 2
SP  - 231
VL  - 43
DO  - 10.5937/socpreg0902231P
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2009",
abstract = "The article discusses sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science. Section 1 introduces different types of institutionalism. Section 3 compares the old with the new institutionalism. Since new institutionalism is sociological in nature, section 4 links new institutionalism with social behavior. Section 5 discusses common features of all types of institutionalism. Sections 6-8 lays out main elements of normative institutionalism. Section 9 concludes by highlighting the relevance of new institutionalism for political science. ., U tekstu se izlažu sociološke osnovne normativnog institucionalizma u političkoj nauci. Najpre se pravi razgraničenje između različitih vrsta institucionalizama. Odeljak 3 poredi novi sa starim institucionalizmom. Budući da novi institucionalizam ima najviše dodira sa sociologijom, u odeljku 4 izlaže se veza novog institucionalizma i društvenog ponašanja. Odeljak 5 objašnjava šta su zajedničke karakteristike svih vrsta institucionalizama, dok se u odeljcima 6-8 izlažu glavni koncepti normativnog institicionalizma. Odeljak 9 zaključuje tekst, ističući značaj novog institucionalizma za savremenu političku nauku.",
publisher = "Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Sociološki pregled",
title = "Sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science, Sociološke osnove normativnog institucionalizma u političkoj nauci",
pages = "250-231",
number = "2",
volume = "43",
doi = "10.5937/socpreg0902231P"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2009). Sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science. in Sociološki pregled
Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd., 43(2), 231-250.
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0902231P

Pavlović D. Sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science. in Sociološki pregled. 2009;43(2):231-250.
doi:10.5937/socpreg0902231P .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Sociological foundations of normative institutionalism in political science" in Sociološki pregled, 43, no. 2 (2009):231-250,
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0902231P . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2008
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/157
AB  - Classification of Milošević's regime as authoritarian, and Đinđić's government as democratic represents a prevailing oversimplification that misses out the nature and development of democracy in Serbia. The author argues that Milošević's regime was a unconsolidated form of democracy because the opposition and elections mattered a great deal in it. Still, it never became a consolidated democracy but rather evolved as a combination of authoritarian and democratic elements. In the second part of the article, the author discusses the first post-Milošević government headed by Đinđić, concluding that it had also failed in strengthening of institutions, but that this failure, in difference, was due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of economic reforms. This, however, still does not justify the use of authoritarian means. .
AB  - Klasifikacija Miloševićevog režima kao autoritarnog i Đinđićeve vlade kao demokratske predstavlja uobičajeno pojednostavljivanje kojem izmiče prava priroda i razvoj demokratije u Srbiji. Autor dokazuje da je Miloševićev režim bio nekonsolidovani oblik demokratije jer su i opozicija i izbori bili od velikog značaja. Ipak, Srbija nije postala konsolidovana demokratija, već se pre razvijala kroz preplitanje autoritarnih i demokratskih elemenata. U drugom delu članka autor raspravlja o prvoj vladi nakon Miloševića koju je vodio Đinđić, zaključujući da je i ova vlada takođe podbacila u ojačavanju institucija, ali da je ovaj neuspeh, u ovom slučaju, bio uslovljen pogrešnim shvatanjem značenja ekonomskih reformi. Ovo, međutim, još uvek ne opravdava upotrebu autoritarnih sredstava. .
PB  - IIC Nova srpska politička misao, Beograd
T2  - Nova srpska politička misao
T1  - Serbia during and after Milosevic
T1  - Srbija u vreme i posle Miloševića
EP  - 66
IS  - 3-4
SP  - 53
VL  - 17
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_157
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2008",
abstract = "Classification of Milošević's regime as authoritarian, and Đinđić's government as democratic represents a prevailing oversimplification that misses out the nature and development of democracy in Serbia. The author argues that Milošević's regime was a unconsolidated form of democracy because the opposition and elections mattered a great deal in it. Still, it never became a consolidated democracy but rather evolved as a combination of authoritarian and democratic elements. In the second part of the article, the author discusses the first post-Milošević government headed by Đinđić, concluding that it had also failed in strengthening of institutions, but that this failure, in difference, was due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of economic reforms. This, however, still does not justify the use of authoritarian means. ., Klasifikacija Miloševićevog režima kao autoritarnog i Đinđićeve vlade kao demokratske predstavlja uobičajeno pojednostavljivanje kojem izmiče prava priroda i razvoj demokratije u Srbiji. Autor dokazuje da je Miloševićev režim bio nekonsolidovani oblik demokratije jer su i opozicija i izbori bili od velikog značaja. Ipak, Srbija nije postala konsolidovana demokratija, već se pre razvijala kroz preplitanje autoritarnih i demokratskih elemenata. U drugom delu članka autor raspravlja o prvoj vladi nakon Miloševića koju je vodio Đinđić, zaključujući da je i ova vlada takođe podbacila u ojačavanju institucija, ali da je ovaj neuspeh, u ovom slučaju, bio uslovljen pogrešnim shvatanjem značenja ekonomskih reformi. Ovo, međutim, još uvek ne opravdava upotrebu autoritarnih sredstava. .",
publisher = "IIC Nova srpska politička misao, Beograd",
journal = "Nova srpska politička misao",
title = "Serbia during and after Milosevic, Srbija u vreme i posle Miloševića",
pages = "66-53",
number = "3-4",
volume = "17",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_157"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2008). Serbia during and after Milosevic. in Nova srpska politička misao
IIC Nova srpska politička misao, Beograd., 17(3-4), 53-66.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_157

Pavlović D. Serbia during and after Milosevic. in Nova srpska politička misao. 2008;17(3-4):53-66.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_157 .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Serbia during and after Milosevic" in Nova srpska politička misao, 17, no. 3-4 (2008):53-66,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_157 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2007
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/127
AB  - In this article author intends to offer the way how to measure the degree of inner democracy in Serbian political parties. This could be realized with reference to six indicators as follows: toleration of inner fractions, autonomy of local party representatives, legislation and way of election of party leaders, nomination of candidates for public offices, relation between the party and its parliamentary group and party’s horizontal structure. Every indicator is ranged with marks from 1 to 3. Aim of the work is to construct the index suitable for comparation of inner democracy of political parties in the single party system as well as within various party systems.
AB  - Tekst nudi jedan od mogućih načina za merenje nivoa unutrašnje demokratije političkih partija u Srbiji. Nivo unutrašnje demokratije meri se u šest oblasti: tolerisanje unutrašnjih frakcija, autonomija lokalnih ogranaka partija, ovlašćenja i način izbora lidera stranaka, nominacija kandidata za javne položaje, odnos između partije i njene parlamentarne grupe i horizontalna struktura stranaka. Svaka oblast rangira se ocenama od 1 do 3. Cilj teksta je da se konstruiše indeks kojim bi unutrašnja demokratičnost stranaka mogla da se upoređuje među strankama unutar jednog stranačkog sistema, kao i unutar različitih stranačkih sistema.
PB  - Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd
T2  - Sociološki pregled
T1  - Inner democracy in the case of Serbian political parties in the period 2000-2006
T1  - Unutrašnja demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije u periodu 2000-2006. godine
EP  - 141
IS  - 1
SP  - 123
VL  - 41
DO  - 10.5937/socpreg0701123P
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2007",
abstract = "In this article author intends to offer the way how to measure the degree of inner democracy in Serbian political parties. This could be realized with reference to six indicators as follows: toleration of inner fractions, autonomy of local party representatives, legislation and way of election of party leaders, nomination of candidates for public offices, relation between the party and its parliamentary group and party’s horizontal structure. Every indicator is ranged with marks from 1 to 3. Aim of the work is to construct the index suitable for comparation of inner democracy of political parties in the single party system as well as within various party systems., Tekst nudi jedan od mogućih načina za merenje nivoa unutrašnje demokratije političkih partija u Srbiji. Nivo unutrašnje demokratije meri se u šest oblasti: tolerisanje unutrašnjih frakcija, autonomija lokalnih ogranaka partija, ovlašćenja i način izbora lidera stranaka, nominacija kandidata za javne položaje, odnos između partije i njene parlamentarne grupe i horizontalna struktura stranaka. Svaka oblast rangira se ocenama od 1 do 3. Cilj teksta je da se konstruiše indeks kojim bi unutrašnja demokratičnost stranaka mogla da se upoređuje među strankama unutar jednog stranačkog sistema, kao i unutar različitih stranačkih sistema.",
publisher = "Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Sociološki pregled",
title = "Inner democracy in the case of Serbian political parties in the period 2000-2006, Unutrašnja demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije u periodu 2000-2006. godine",
pages = "141-123",
number = "1",
volume = "41",
doi = "10.5937/socpreg0701123P"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2007). Inner democracy in the case of Serbian political parties in the period 2000-2006. in Sociološki pregled
Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd., 41(1), 123-141.
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0701123P

Pavlović D. Inner democracy in the case of Serbian political parties in the period 2000-2006. in Sociološki pregled. 2007;41(1):123-141.
doi:10.5937/socpreg0701123P .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Inner democracy in the case of Serbian political parties in the period 2000-2006" in Sociološki pregled, 41, no. 1 (2007):123-141,
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0701123P . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2006
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/121
AB  - The risk of political and economic transformation in Central and East Europe after 1990 was based on the presumption that the reforms will collapse when the citizens realize that the cost they have to pay for them is too high. The classical claim was that democracy will be destroyed by democratic means-namely, that the losers in the transition will vote the way back to the authoritarian regime. The article offers an explanation as to the regress to the authoritarian regime will not be a consequence of the economic reforms. The article is divided in six section. Section 1 considers the general context of the start of the economic transformation in the light of the debate about the choice between the expert government and the significance of democratic procedures for economic reforms. Section 2 defines the context of Serbia within which economic transformation started out after 2000. Sections 4-5 consider economic policy of the two post-Milosevic government. The major finding is that it was the economic policy that was highly socially sensible that prevented social uprising and undermining democracy by democratic means. Section 6 concludes by applying the concept of equilibrium of partial reforms.
AB  - Najčešće pominjani rizik ekonomske i političke transformacije u Centralnoj i Istočnoj Evropi posle 1990. godine bio je taj da će reforme propasti kada građani uvide da je cena koja treba da se plati za ekonomske reforme previsoka. Tvrdilo se da će tzv. gubitnici u tranziciji uništiti demokratiju demokratskim sredstvima, odn. da će na izborima glasati za političke snage koje će ponovo uspostaviti autoritarni režim. Ovaj tekst pokušava da objasni zbog čega povratak u autoritarni režim u Srbiji neće biti posledica sprovođenja ekonomskih reformi. Tekst je podeljen u šest odeljaka. U odeljku 1 razmatra se opšti kontekst početka ekonomske transformacije u svetlu debate o izboru između vlade eksperata i demokratskih procedura. Odeljak 2 definiše socialnoekonomski kontekst Srbije u kome se odvija ekonomska transformacija. Odeljci 4-5 analiziraju ekonomsku politiku prve dve post-miloševićevske vlade. Nalaz ovih odeljaka je da je ekonomska politika počivala na principima sa ciljem da ublaže socijalne troškove ekonomske transformacije za gubitnike u tranziciji, što je sprečilo socijalni bunt i obaranje demokratije demokratskim sredstvima. Odeljak 6 zaključuje analizu primenom koncepta o ekvilibrijumu parcijalnih reformi.
PB  - Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd
T2  - Sociološki pregled
T1  - Social costs of transition
T1  - Socijalna cena tranzicije
EP  - 281
IS  - 2
SP  - 263
VL  - 40
DO  - 10.5937/socpreg0602263P
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2006",
abstract = "The risk of political and economic transformation in Central and East Europe after 1990 was based on the presumption that the reforms will collapse when the citizens realize that the cost they have to pay for them is too high. The classical claim was that democracy will be destroyed by democratic means-namely, that the losers in the transition will vote the way back to the authoritarian regime. The article offers an explanation as to the regress to the authoritarian regime will not be a consequence of the economic reforms. The article is divided in six section. Section 1 considers the general context of the start of the economic transformation in the light of the debate about the choice between the expert government and the significance of democratic procedures for economic reforms. Section 2 defines the context of Serbia within which economic transformation started out after 2000. Sections 4-5 consider economic policy of the two post-Milosevic government. The major finding is that it was the economic policy that was highly socially sensible that prevented social uprising and undermining democracy by democratic means. Section 6 concludes by applying the concept of equilibrium of partial reforms., Najčešće pominjani rizik ekonomske i političke transformacije u Centralnoj i Istočnoj Evropi posle 1990. godine bio je taj da će reforme propasti kada građani uvide da je cena koja treba da se plati za ekonomske reforme previsoka. Tvrdilo se da će tzv. gubitnici u tranziciji uništiti demokratiju demokratskim sredstvima, odn. da će na izborima glasati za političke snage koje će ponovo uspostaviti autoritarni režim. Ovaj tekst pokušava da objasni zbog čega povratak u autoritarni režim u Srbiji neće biti posledica sprovođenja ekonomskih reformi. Tekst je podeljen u šest odeljaka. U odeljku 1 razmatra se opšti kontekst početka ekonomske transformacije u svetlu debate o izboru između vlade eksperata i demokratskih procedura. Odeljak 2 definiše socialnoekonomski kontekst Srbije u kome se odvija ekonomska transformacija. Odeljci 4-5 analiziraju ekonomsku politiku prve dve post-miloševićevske vlade. Nalaz ovih odeljaka je da je ekonomska politika počivala na principima sa ciljem da ublaže socijalne troškove ekonomske transformacije za gubitnike u tranziciji, što je sprečilo socijalni bunt i obaranje demokratije demokratskim sredstvima. Odeljak 6 zaključuje analizu primenom koncepta o ekvilibrijumu parcijalnih reformi.",
publisher = "Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Sociološki pregled",
title = "Social costs of transition, Socijalna cena tranzicije",
pages = "281-263",
number = "2",
volume = "40",
doi = "10.5937/socpreg0602263P"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2006). Social costs of transition. in Sociološki pregled
Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd., 40(2), 263-281.
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0602263P

Pavlović D. Social costs of transition. in Sociološki pregled. 2006;40(2):263-281.
doi:10.5937/socpreg0602263P .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Social costs of transition" in Sociološki pregled, 40, no. 2 (2006):263-281,
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0602263P . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
PY  - 2005
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/108
AB  - The article looks into the nature of the Serbian political regime under Milosevic and under Đinđić. After the discussion on the suitability of various types of definition of non-democratic regime, the article classifies both regimes as hybrid democracies by way of applying the definition of competitive authoritarianism developed by Levistky and Way. The last part discusses four areas of competitive authoritarianism.
AB  - U tekstu se analizira priroda političkog režima za vreme vladavine Slobodana Miloševića i vlade Zorana Đinđića. Nakon diskusije o primenljivosti različitih definicija nedemokratskih režima na slučaj Srbije za vreme i nakon vladavine Miloševića, tekst klasifikuje oba režima kao kvazidemokratska, primenjujući koncept kompetitivnog autoritarizma koji su razvili američki teoretičari Levitski (Levistky) i Uej (Way). Poslednji deo teksta analizira četiri oblasti karakteristične za kompetitivni autoritarizam u oba slučaja.
PB  - Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd
T2  - Sociološki pregled
T1  - Serbia during Milosevic’s rule and after
T1  - Srbija za vreme i nakon Miloševića
EP  - 196
IS  - 2
SP  - 183
VL  - 39
DO  - 10.5937/socpreg0502183P
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan",
year = "2005",
abstract = "The article looks into the nature of the Serbian political regime under Milosevic and under Đinđić. After the discussion on the suitability of various types of definition of non-democratic regime, the article classifies both regimes as hybrid democracies by way of applying the definition of competitive authoritarianism developed by Levistky and Way. The last part discusses four areas of competitive authoritarianism., U tekstu se analizira priroda političkog režima za vreme vladavine Slobodana Miloševića i vlade Zorana Đinđića. Nakon diskusije o primenljivosti različitih definicija nedemokratskih režima na slučaj Srbije za vreme i nakon vladavine Miloševića, tekst klasifikuje oba režima kao kvazidemokratska, primenjujući koncept kompetitivnog autoritarizma koji su razvili američki teoretičari Levitski (Levistky) i Uej (Way). Poslednji deo teksta analizira četiri oblasti karakteristične za kompetitivni autoritarizam u oba slučaja.",
publisher = "Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd",
journal = "Sociološki pregled",
title = "Serbia during Milosevic’s rule and after, Srbija za vreme i nakon Miloševića",
pages = "196-183",
number = "2",
volume = "39",
doi = "10.5937/socpreg0502183P"
}

Pavlović, D.. (2005). Serbia during Milosevic’s rule and after. in Sociološki pregled
Sociološko društvo Srbije, Beograd., 39(2), 183-196.
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0502183P

Pavlović D. Serbia during Milosevic’s rule and after. in Sociološki pregled. 2005;39(2):183-196.
doi:10.5937/socpreg0502183P .

Pavlović, Dušan, "Serbia during Milosevic’s rule and after" in Sociološki pregled, 39, no. 2 (2005):183-196,
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0502183P . .