The essential contestedness and political concepts

Abstract

This paper explores one part of the changes that political theory underwent in the second half of the 20th century. The topic of the paper is the somewhat neglected, yet epistemologically very significant, essential contestability thesis. The author's basic assumption is that the thesis reflects the view of the ontological relativism of politics, from which it follows that political concepts are essentially contestable, i.e. that it is impossible to select one adequate general approach that could serve as a basis for determining which of the possible understandings of a particular concept is uncontestably the best. The dominant thesis in the middle decades of the 20th century was the thesis of the eath of political philosophy. It was believed that the subject of the classical political philosophy was a delusive (re)shaping of the mental objects, which usually does not correspond to the state of affairs in the world. Set in the context of the Second World War mass destruction and the outset of the Cold War, this argument was detrimental to the vitality of political philosophy. The thesis of essential contestability of political concepts created in such context was considered to be one more attempt to discredit the basic vales of normative theories. This text challenges this belief by claiming that it was the essential contestability that offered a different understanding of the ontological status of politics, placing it into the sphere of ontological relativism and pluralism of values. Only after these ontological and epistemological conditions were met was the basis set for what we now call modern political theory. The aim of this paper is to present a draft for the possible argumentation for the ontological relativity of politics. To achieve this aim, using analytic approach, the author follows the argumentation for ontological relativity presented by W.O.Quine. After the author defines the theoretical framework, he gives an overview and the analysis of the dominant theories of the essential contestability of political concepts.

Ovaj rad se bavi delom promena koje je politička teorija doživela u drugoj polovini XX veka. Predmet rada je pomalo zapostavljena, ali u epistemološkom smislu izuzetno značajna, teza o suštinskoj spornosti pojmova. Autor polazi od pretpostavke da je teza utemeljena u shvatanju ontološke relativnosti politike, na osnovu koje se izvodi zaključak da su politički pojmovi suštinski sporni, odnosno da se ne može izabrati adekvatan generalni pristup na osnovu kojeg bi se moglo odrediti da je neko mogućih od shvatanja pojma zaista najbolje. Sredinom XX veka dominirala je teza o smrti političke filozofije. Smatralo se da je predmet klasične političke filozofije isprazno (pre)oblikovanje mentalnih objekata, koje uglavnom nekorespondira stanju stvari u svetu. U kontekstu masovnih razaranja u II svetskom ratu i zahuktavanju Hladnog rata, ovaj argument je delovao pogubno na vitalnost političke filozofije. Teza o suštinskoj spornosti političkih pojmova koja je nastala upravo u takvom kontekstu, smatrana je za još jedan pokušaj diskreditacije osnovnih vrednosti normativnih teorija. Ovaj tekst polemiše sa ovom tezom, zastupajući stav da je suštinska spornost upravo pružila drugačije shvatanje ontološkog statusa politike, smeštajući je u ravan ontološke relativnosti i pluralizma vrednosti. Tek kada su ovi ontološkoepistemološki uslovi bili ispunjeni, postavljena je osnova za dalju izgradnju onoga što nazivamo savremenom političkom teorijom. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da skicira moguću argumentaciju za ontološku relativnost politike. U izvođenju postavljenog cilja, kroz analitički pristup, autor prati argumentaciju za ontološku relativnost koju pruža V.O. Kvajn. Nakon postavljenog teorijskog okvira, autor daje pregled ali i analizu dominantnih teorija o suštinskoj spornosti političkih pojmova.