Competitive authoritarianism and popular protest: Evidence from Serbia under Milosevic

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between competitive authoritarianism and popular protest. Building upon comparative regime analysis and social movement research, it argues that this hybrid regime type facilitates popular protest by providing opposition forces with considerable institutional resources to organize themselves and confront regime elites, along with grievances that provide strong incentives for popular challenges. In turn, popular protest may trigger regime crisis and extract important concessions from regime incumbents. In the long run, popular politics strongly shapes the interests, identities and capacities of regime elites and opposition forces, as well as the regime's formal and/or informal institutions, and may lead to government change and/or regime change. Evidence is provided from Serbia under Miloevi, which experienced massive opposition protest campaigns in 1991, 1992, 1996-1997, 1999 and 2000, which resulted in regime change.