Приказ основних података о документу
Democratic values, emotions and emotivism
Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam
dc.creator | Vranić, Bojan | |
dc.creator | Vranić, Bojan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-04-02T12:15:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-04-02T12:15:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-5738 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/561 | |
dc.description.abstract | The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson's ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum's concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents' emotional judgments. | en |
dc.description.abstract | Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera. | sr |
dc.publisher | Univerzitet u Beogradu - Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd | |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179076/RS// | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Filozofija i društvo | |
dc.subject | democracy | en |
dc.subject | emotivism | en |
dc.subject | emotional judgments | en |
dc.subject | moral disagreement | en |
dc.subject | demokratija | sr |
dc.subject | emotivizam | sr |
dc.subject | emocionalni sudovi | sr |
dc.subject | moralni sporovi | sr |
dc.title | Democratic values, emotions and emotivism | en |
dc.title | Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam | sr |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC-ND | |
dc.citation.epage | 738 | |
dc.citation.issue | 4 | |
dc.citation.other | 27(4): 723-738 | |
dc.citation.rank | M24 | |
dc.citation.spage | 723 | |
dc.citation.volume | 27 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/FID1604723V | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/370/558.pdf | |
dc.identifier.wos | 000408374000002 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |