

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UDC: 327(520)
Biblid 0543-3657, 66 (2015)
Vol. LXVI, No. 1157, pp. 5–26
Original Scientific Paper

ABE DOCTRINE AND JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract: While apparently preserving general course and framework of Japan's post-war foreign and security order, Prime Minister Abe has actually initiated complex and controversial changes in their context that have caused simultaneous support, uneasiness and strong criticism at home and abroad. His concept of 'active contributor to peace' has added to growing dynamism of on going rebalancing of power in Asia-Pacific and on the other hand, emphasized regional and global role of Japan.

Key words: Abe Shinzo, Abe Doctrine, Japan, 'active contributor to peace'.

INTRODUCTION

While pursuing his second mandate as Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe for sure has been trying to fulfil any prime minister's job – to provide economic prosperity and security to his people. What have challenged his second attempt to perform successfully are severe international circumstances – economic, political and security ones, regionally and globally, as well as enlarged sensitivity at home for economic, political and ecological issues. What differs him from his predecessors at the post of Japanese Prime Minister is his expressive stile, as well as the practice and doctrine it is based on. His extensive diplomatic performance, on multilateral and especially bilateral level, equally caused domestic and foreign attention as well as pronouncement of the so called *Abe Doctrine* in several speeches and papers, and through the newly adopted security policy papers and government decision to

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reinterpret Constitution different that it has been done since 1972 and 1981 (Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, p. 9).

It is possible to see Prime Minister Abe's aim to follow the steps of his predecessors in the shoes of PM of Japan in their attempt to provide the basic national goals – to provide economic prosperity and security to his nation. The former he has been trying to achieve by introducing package of economic measures, so called *Abenomics*, still not unwrapped in totality, with some questionable elements, and some appreciated ones, at least within big businesses community if not the majority of the population, that has been mostly hit by it so far (Finbarr, 2014). The second one – that is to provide security by extensive foreign policy first started with announcing its doctrine – Abe Doctrine – which for many is total abandoning of Yoshida Doctrine and, what is even more important, Fukuda Doctrine. Many neighbours of Japan and many inside Japan see *Abe Doctrine* as abandoning the path of those Japanese prime ministers who were highly appreciated and trusted by Japanese neighbours and Japanese nation. What is inseparably part of that doctrine, as much as *Abenomics*, has been the new security doctrine of Japan that has been developed in several documents and papers, speeches and acts delivered by Abe and fully explored in the Defence White Paper published in summer 2014.

ABE DOCTRINE – REASONING BEHIND

At the moment when Abe Shinzo was appointed as Prime Minister for the second time in his political career, for sure he got a strong ambition to perform much better than during the previous (and) abruptly ended time on the post, and left more beyond as personal political legacy, as well as to contribute more to his family's grand political legacy in post-war Japanese history. Abe's maternal grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke (born as Sato Nobusuke), former Japanese prime minister (1957-60), was one of the most prominent pre and post war Japanese politicians, conservative with vision and capability to realize much of it, has been his role model since childhood (Yoshida, 2012). Prime Minister Kishi was one of the conservatives who managed to revise Japanese post war 'peace Constitution' towards creating Self Defence Forces in 1960 and to keep firm on the close security coop with the USA as the guarantee for Japanese security and comfortable framework for Japanese economic performance. This enabled his government that in January 1960 signs a revised U.S.–Japan Security Treaty intended to put the relationship between the two nations on an equal basis and to restore independent diplomacy for Japan. At the same time, during previous years, he also had paid efforts to improve relations with the nations of Southeast and South Asia, visiting them in 1957 with proposals of reparations agreements and economic cooperation (Nobusuke. 2014). At the time of his grandfather's political reign, young Abe admired his hard work, dedication and vision of his country's restoration and

progress. At the same time, as a young man, he felt alienated from a majority of his generation and general public influenced by leftist mainstream intellectuals, who pointed at his grandfather as a representative of the militarist Japanese past and statehood, whose personal responsibility was even questioned by the Occupation authorities after the World War II. As explained in his book “Toward a Beautiful Country” Abe admired his grandfather and understood his visionary dedication to his country’s recovery and becoming truly independent state again.

On the other hand, his work as his father’s secretary when Abe Shintaro was Japanese foreign minister (1982-86) helped him to develop understanding of highly needed flexibility and personal connection impact on successful foreign policy performance (Yoshida, 2012). That “dual approach” could be seen in Prime Minister Abe’s pose, as parallel to his conservatism and determination in pursuing his agenda, elements of charm offensives and openness towards building personal relations with world leaders were also obvious.² Another important figure from Prime Minister Abe’s family from his mother’s side and another role model was Satō Eisaku, younger brother of Prime Minister Kishi, who was prime minister of Japan between 1964 and 1972, and played extremely important role in Japan’s post-World War II re-emergence as a major world power. In 1969 Satō reached an agreement with U.S. President Richard Nixon for future return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan that officially happened in 1972, the removal of all nuclear weapons from the area, and the continued maintenance of the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. Even though, SatM came under heavy criticism for provisions in the agreement that allowed U.S. military forces to remain on Okinawa Island after its return to Japan, although secret amendments of the agreement that put financial burden on Japan were not known to the public. For his position on nuclear weapons that resulted in Japan’s signing the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1974.

Coming after long chain of very short holdings of the post by his predecessors,³ Abe Shinzo’s hold on time was uncertain, although after poor performance by the Democratic Party led government, more open towards relative longevity. Nevertheless, when LDP (with minor New Komeito backing) won victory in both houses in July 2013 elections (Sieg, 2014), a new perspective, both on time in the

² Typical case was his intention to establish and deepen personal relations with the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Putin and his attempt to “charm” President of the Republic of Korea with greeting her in Korean, during the trilateral summit with her and USA president, Obama.

³ Junichiro Koizumi (LDP): 1980 days, Shinzo Abe (LDP): 366 days, Yasuo Fukuda (LDP): 365 days, Taro Aso (LDP): 358 days, Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ): 266 days, Naoto Kan (DPJ): 452 days, Yoshihiko Noda (DPJ): 482 days. Tsukimura, Taro, *Japan and the Collective Self-Defense*, presentation at the conference “Major international issues in the 21st Century – from perspective of Japan and Europe”, IPE, Belgrade, 15 September 2014

office and power of his government emerged, perspective that had opened the door wider to his ambitious agenda that was announced soon. This political space was confirmed with sudden December 2014 dissolution of Parliament and the following victory of LDP in both chambers of Diet.

Abe's foreign policy goals are focused on answering challenges born in the international environment – regional and global one – and at home. One of the most demanding tests of Japan's ability to coop with the ongoing international developments is posed by change in the balance of power among world nations, some of which caused by the rapidly gained economic and political power of the “emerging countries” that has strengthened their global influence. Among those, PR China's extended influence in the international political economy, accompanied with her expanding military capability and stronger political positioning has been the most alerting for Japan. Some aspects of the ongoing deepening of globalization increase risks coming from being more active globally - on the level of nations, corporations and individuals - that could be coming from international terrorist organizations or pirates or other criminal groups, now technically advanced and possibly even armed with weapons of mass destruction. On the other side of this balance is the declining influence and superiority of the United States that creates change in the balance of power on the global scene and asks for new structures and arrangements that require broad and very complex, yet fragile consensus. Additionally, Japan's dependency on fuels imports, dramatically increased after shutting down all eleven nuclear plants after The Great Eastern Earthquake in 2011, makes its economy particularly dependent on global energy market, global trade and transportation, while as all major global investors and exporters it has buffered with difficulties and economic and social costs all the negative trends coming from other major economies.

There have been some remarkable phenomena developing in East Asia, but not only of regional importance, but global ones too, for which naturally Japan has been vitally interested in and involved into. One of the most important ones was in 2009 announcement of USA Asia Pivot,⁴ that has not been never delivered or not delivered to the extent that was announced, expected and desired by the USA's regional allies, including Japan (Baumiller, 2011). Also, there has been so strong and unexpectedly boldly expressed rise of China in the region, not only economically (and culturally), but also by military means and in geopolitical sense. That caused an immediate response and urged for accommodation of all the regionally present states - from the global super-power, USA, tradition Chinese allies and friends in the region, those states which were accommodated by intense economic

⁴ The administration of President Barack Obama first announced this strategic re-shifting in July 2009 at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Singapore, in the speech of US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton.

cooperation with China during last two decades, and those whose relations with China has been mixture of cooperation and competition with ideological distance, including Japan.

The challenging phenomenon for the whole East Asian region and all the neighbours, with more, less and no understanding for its unique position, has been dynamics of political and military developments inside North Korea and their outward expressions. Not only that Democratic People's Republic of Korea has repeatedly tested nuclear bombs and claimed to be able to put it into missile, it also tested middle-range missile and proved it was able to reach fair parts of Japanese territory if still not to successfully launch long-range one. Japan was carefully following the consolidation of the regime around Kim Jong-Un and engaged in several initiatives aimed at relaxing if not solving the issue of the abduction of its citizens and their offspring living in PDR Korea today.

Many of the newly emerged economic rising powers are also situated in this part of the world that gives impetus to the regional economic development – said to be the world's most dynamic region - and adds an optimistic note to the global economic gloomy prospects, but also has required reshuffling and adjustment. Additionally, there has been rising tension coming from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) developing on a parallel tracks as rival trading blocs, one led by the USA and excluding China, and the other led by China, excluding the USA, as their parallelism has created complex economic, political and security issues. Japan, as other countries with dual membership is specially challenged by this role. Some analysts, though, see such countries as those positioned favourably to help facilitating the adoption of compatible rules.

Territorial and maritime disputes in East China Sea and in South China Sea added to complexity of the regional kaleidoscope and deepened security concerns inside and outside Japan and led to the first time in modern history biggest purchasing of weaponry by Asian nations than by Western industrialized countries (Thalif, 2012). In spite of decades old and some newer, but also successful regional mechanisms of cooperation and multi level diplomacy and intra-regional economic cooperation, there has not been one security mechanism for solving all the mounting uncertainties – old and new ones – neither there has been established a *code of conduct* for dealing with such security problems and challenges. There is a rising number of uncertainties and all these uncertainties affect Japan to a great deal. On the other hand, history has remained highly important in Asia. Memory of history remains strong, and accordingly, historical issues tend to be easy to emerge and cause huge political and emotional tensions able to affect relations between Asian states and within Japan that could affect the public support of the government. Due to its late XIX and XX century history with Asian neighbours, Japans attitude towards common history has been under particular attention and

highly sensitive measurement by the others. Accordingly, there has been another dimension of Prime Minister Abe Doctrine and its realization, as it has had double-track impact. It means it affects a lot domestic political and economic development in Japan, and at the same time it has simultaneous influence on intra-regional economic, security and political relations and inter-states relations in East Asia.

Japan finds risks coming out of broader use of global commons, especially seas, outer space and cyberspace ever more increasing. As an island state Japan is strategically vitally dependent on open and regulated fishing, transportation of trade and fuels exploration activities' regulation in the seas, sea lanes and seabed surrounding its territory. Japan proved to be particularly vulnerable by any action challenging the existing order in the seas and oceans surrounding it, including piracy in South-East Asia and Western African coast, environmental damages or intrusion of unidentified vessels. From this vulnerability comes Japan's insisting on 'the rule of law at sea' and promotion of it within its foreign policy apparatus and insisting on international unison activity. Regarding outer space, Japan finds that beyond its valuable utilization for civilian activities, more and more countries being able to use it for surveillance and information gathering make it more sensitive issue, especially after some of the 'newcomers' as China, developed and used satellite-destroying weapons. Even though, the first two are accessible to few relevant actors, while cyberspace with nearly universal accessibility, anonymity, asymmetric nature and no physical territory opens wide door to ongoing and possible cyber-attacks to military systems, strategic infrastructure, classified information of corporations and states and private information of individuals, when controlling it demands building a legal structure and international consensus on how to protect its freedom and upgrade its safety.⁵

Prime Minister Abe was particularly harsh when measuring threat coming from rising China, not without generous assistance coming from Beijing, as both parties used each other positioning, acting and 'intentions' to justify military upgrading budgets, bold statements and finger pointing. In Japan's Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Bluebook 2014 China's strong progress in military capabilities, continues growth of her military budget that was marked as 'without sufficient transparency', as well as her attempts to 'change the *status quo* by coercion' in East China Sea and South China Sea in the maritime and aerial domains were emphasised as incompatible with the existing order of international law and particularly dangerous for the region of East Asia's security environment. As particularly challenging for Japan China's increased activities in the seas and airspace around Japan were seen,

⁵ Publicized report of The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) of Japan claimed that there were 25.66 billion syberattacks on Japanese government and other bodies and corporations were logged during 2014, some 40% coming from China and significant percentage from South Korea, USA and Russia. *Kyodo News*, February 18, 2015

among which Chinese vessels' assertiveness around Senkaku/Diyao islands and unilateral establishment of her Air Defence Identification Zone in November 2013 were noticed as alarming and asking for respond.

ABE DOCTRINE – THEORETICAL LAYOUT AND ITS CONTROVERSIES

Many of Abe critics see his new security and foreign policy doctrine and its legislative backing-up as a demonstration of will of the rightist and ultra-conservative political figure for which Prime Minister Abe does not even have support within his own party and the ruling coalition. They argued that absence of it was why he did not dare to check the level of the support in the Parliament in spite of having dominant majority in both houses of the Diet. Also, while preaching about 'universal values' shared by the 'civilized world' and democracy as one of them in his public statements around the globe, Prime Minister Abe's government did not allow general public and national debate (except for a few expert opinions on the matter through almost private Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security) nor discussion or voting in the Diet on the re-interpretation of the Constitution, but only did it as an act of the Cabinet, although such a process in democratic political system is of a crucial importance and should be delivered under widest scrutiny. Such a manner neither made this change the result of the wide political representation nor as the expression of the political will of the nation – on the contrary, it created even deeper division within political and electoral body on the highly controversial and sensitive issue opening by this question of the legitimacy of the new re-interpretation. Furthermore, it not only caused strong uneasiness among the Japanese nation, but created division among the ruling coalition, as it is not easy for The New Komeito Party, due to its peace oriented religious affiliation to support such change of the 'Peace Constitution'. Of course, it caused rising brows among most of the Japanese neighbours, which is the factors that for sure will not contribute to the 'peaceful contribution to peace' nor will help Abe's mission to be successful and welcomed by them. It is not difficult to agree with the criticisms that mark such acts of Abe's government as challenges to the deepening of democracy in Japan and not contribution to it.

One of the first pieces on regional diplomacy and security written by Prime Minister Abe and posted on December 27, 2012 on the web site of Project Syndicate caused criticism among his critics at home and abroad, although published before his first wholesome foreign policy speech. It was titled 'Asia's Democratic Security Diamond' as it graphically explained his strategy that 'Australia, India, Japan and U.S. State of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific'. India was specifically called into deepened defence and economic cooperation with Japan, as

the two ‘must join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian oceans’. Critics saw it as confirmation of the widely spread perception of his conservatism and hawkishness, that argue for confrontation instead for conciliatory stances and policies and a radical departure from post-war decades of pacifism. It was also seen as mere strategy of containment against China (Hayashi, 2013).

In the paper Prime Minister Abe strongly criticised China for her military expansion and assertive behaviour in East China Sea and South China Sea, for turning the former into ‘Lake Beijing’ and polygon for her nuclear-powered attack submarines aimed in ‘scaring the neighbours’. Explaining why Japan has to respond to the similar behaviour of China in East China Sea Prime Minister Abe pointed that daily routine of coercion around Senkaku/Diyao islands by Chinese ships had an aim to make their presence appearing normal, and over becoming ordinary present there China wanted to empower her jurisdiction in the surrounding waters as a *fait accompli*.

In contrast, others see ambition of Prime Minister Abe to reform Japan’s security legislation and strategy and reinterpret the so called ‘peace constitution’ and its Article 9 as desirable and positive development. Abe’s main goals were noticed as attempts to improve Japan’s capability to respond to threats that could not be defined as ‘arm attacks’, to enable Japan to more efficiently take part in peacekeeping activities as permitting it to protect other mission members and to be able to redefine measures that it will be able to take for self-defence under the Article 9 of the Constitution. Like Prime Minister Abe, those positive reviewers of his policy stipulates that these measures will make Japan more capable to play its role in strategic security partnership within the US-Japan Security Treaty, that for them is the basis for stability and economic development in Asia-Pacific. Such neediness comes from the reality of East Asia, which did not see the post-war true reconciliation, or conflict resolution permanent and comprehensive mechanisms while threats are severe. According to such analyses, Japan’s security is particularly challenged by the economic, political and military rise of China and its assertiveness when comes to the territorial disputes and sea-lanes that are ‘vital to Japanese trade’ and by unpredictable, though military ambitious regime in PDRK, to whom it must respond by being prepared ‘against uncertainty’, while engaged in cooperation. The other strategic goal of Prime Minister Abe is recognized as an attempt to change the very nature of the Japan-USA alliance, by making it more symmetric. The proposed step, additional to the changes already proposed by Abe, was one that led more boldly towards the Japanese control over the US bases on its territory, one after another, including those in Okinawa, where basis would be run and controlled by Japanese forces and US forces would just rotated among them. While this projection calls for more equal partnership between the two allies and see Abe’s government’s new military doctrine as a positive step towards it, the former does not explore the financial aspect of such future

arrangements regarding the basis on the Japanese soil, while it gives impression of the “inevitability and lucidity” of the solution.

Abe's administration move towards reinterpretation of the Constitution regarding the reconstruction of the legal basis for national security was praised by scholars taking part in the Tokyo Foundation's Forum focused on the issue of 'Task and Prospects of Abe's Diplomacy', as one leading to more functional security policy and in particular defence capability, especially when it comes to the so called 'grey zone' circumstances and occasions that lay between organized armed attack and peace. As pointed, the previous legal basis interpretation was too rigid and thus inadequate, restricted by 'legal and political concerns'(Watanabe, 2014) even when it comes to self-defence needs of Japan. Having China in mind, author reflects to an expert panel, organized and hosted by Prime Minister Abe on February 4, 2014 that recommended to the government and the Diet to enable use of the SDF in the so called 'grey zone', as China has been 'persistently sending paramilitary vessels into Japan's territorial waters', which, in spite of the danger it brings, would not be considered armed attacks according to the existing legal interpretation. On the other hand, if not responding, Japan would, according to such understandings, send wrong signal and that could lead to heightening of tensions in East China Sea. Abe's administration approach has been marked much more by realism than nationalism and by envisaging the revision of the legislation regarding use of SDF it is making 'a rational and incremental development of democratic governance in Japan's post-war security and defence policy' far away from emotional nationalism.

Some analysts argue that Prime Minister Abe's attempt is graduate evolution from Yoshida and Fukuda doctrines, but in the positive direction, as current situations across East China Sea that is burdened with maritime disputes and frequent mini-crises, which could easily trigger off the diplomatic row, but also military conflict that could have severe regional and even global consequences. By upgrading its capability as an loyal ally, Japan, according to such statements, could contribute the most to strengthening of its primal alliance with the USA by becoming more equal, more reliable and devoted partner, than it proved to be with just financial or logistics support as its solely engagement. Another issue, defended and criticised was idea to allow Japan's SDF to act and come to the aid of allies in UN peacekeeping missions or even of USA forces on the Japanese soil, even if Japanese territory was not attacked or Japan citizens were not targeted.

Understandingly, steady and harsh criticism has been coming from Beijing, as Abe's approach was convenient hot spot for cohesion building and nationalism inspiring sentiments and acts. Chinese media pointed that Abe's 'proactive pacifism' concept was merely catchy expression made to cover his real intentions to turn Self Defence Forces into regular army and Japan into military power in full capacity.

Additionally, as after four decades Japan abandoned the ban to export weapons and military equipment, and contributed to the dangerous development trend, that for the first time in 2012, Asian nations were bigger buyers of the weaponry than the leading industrialized nations. It is tragic tendency regarding so many issues that resources could not be found to be addressed – such as poverty, inequality, poor social and health security systems, even absence of such, poor education network and rate of illiteracy, short life-expectancy as result of those and similar problems that make and uphold poor life quality (Mitrović, 2009). Japan in a significant way contributed to it, not just with its plans and acts to export weaponry to neighbour states that helps economy but is controversial as contribution to strengthening or even maintaining the peace, but also by enlarging its military budget. Abe's cabinet plans to increase military budget by 5% in the mid-term⁶ regarding the efforts invested in strengthening its hard power. So far, Japan for years has been one of the biggest purchaser of the American military equipment and weapons, but the policy change offered some other options. The decision creates a potential for enormous changes in the way Japanese defence suppliers do business, allowing them to concentrate on developing and making weapons' parts in which they have special advantages in building high-end components, particularly electronics, and to become part of the supply chain of the biggest US weaponry producers. That for sure would have a strong impact on *Abenomics* and future GDP growth. Some analysts point that other pacifist or neutral countries are at the same time major weapon exporters, such as Sweden.

Abe's policy change is also part of a larger strategic shift that realizes the weakening of the position of USA, and the newly emerged task for Japan to fill the gap coming from this process, as an active participant in the region's effort to buffer China's expansion. It considers the Southeast Asian states as potential partners in this stand-off with China as protectors of free navigation along their coast, so it wanted to be able to sell arms to those countries, too.

By doing all these, Japan under Prime Minister Abe made huge shift from 'One country pacifism' to 'Collective pacifism' and that was what most critics saw as abandoning the path of his predecessors (de Miguel, 2013). Those who support him, claim that, by doing so he contributed to Japanese security, regarding that is very difficult to predict how long and how strongly Japan could in the future and even now rely on the USA and its announced, but never delivered 'Asia Pivot' due to the budget restraints and obvious signs of the decline of its powers amidst the numerous problems rising from the hot-spots it has had created around the world – especially North Africa, Middle East, Afghanistan, etc., the USA's potential Machiavellism that would lead it to choose China instead of Japan, China rise, rise

⁶ Abe's cabinet announced that ¥24.7 trillion will be spent between 2014 and 2019, including on drones, subs, fighter jets and amphibious vehicles production and purchasing.

of other traditional and non-traditional security treats – from climate change, terrorism, pollution, pandemics of contagious diseases, etc. Analysts and political supporters of those bold steps emphasize that besides giving impetus to improving and expanding Japan's production of 'defence equipment and technology' and by that - export and economy as a whole - Abe's government invigorated security cooperation with them significantly. In March 2014 Abe's government approved new three principles on transferring defence equipment that would 'contribute to world peace and international cooperation only after a strict screening process'.⁷ Also, in an interim report on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-USA Defence Cooperation it is stipulated that Japan and the United States will promote security cooperation with allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

In his address during the General Debate of the UN General Assembly In September 26 2013, Prime Minister Abe emphasised Japan's global role as a 'Proactive Contributor to Peace' through which Japan will contribute to securing 'peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security and peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region', based on the 'principle of international cooperation' with the United States of America and other partners. In December 2013 Japan adopted its first National Security Strategy that further explored Japan's basic policies concerning 'strategic diplomacy' and defence strategy that constitute the policy of 'Proactive Contributor to Peace'. Since taking office for the second time, Prime Minister Abe announced the establishment of the National Security Council and initiated consultations focused on it. After several consultations and papers based on them, the Cabinet decided on 'the Act of Partial Revision of the Establishment of the Security Council (NSC Establishment Act)' on June 7, 2013 (Defence of Japan, p. 106).

ABE'S EXTENSIVE FOREIGN POLICY, RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS

Since taking the office Prime Minister Abe has introduced into reality the premise of 'Taking a Panoramic Respective of the World Map', e.g., strategic foreign policy in which he mixed global geographic scope with preaching 'unilateral values', such as 'freedom, democracy, respect of fundamental human rights, and the rule of law' and pursuing economic policy designated to turn Japan's economy towards

⁷ The so-called three principles on arms exports were adopted in 1967, when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared Japan would prohibit weapons exports to communist countries, countries subject to arms embargoes under U.N. resolutions and countries involved in or feared to be involved in international conflicts. The ban started to fray in 1983, however, when the government allowed Japanese companies to provide weapons technology to the United States as an exception. Since then, 21 "exceptions" have been made by chief Cabinet secretaries issuing a statement, one of which in 2013 allowed Japanese companies to take part in developing the F-35 fighter.

growth and renewed competitiveness. Based on these fundamental policies, Japan's diplomacy has been focused on the four crucial policy areas: strengthening the Japan - United States Alliance as first pillar of its diplomacy, deepening cooperation with neighbouring countries, building stronger economic diplomacy and stronger contribution to global issue solving. The first one, Japan-U.S. Alliance, described as 'becoming more important than ever' has been carefully nurtured by frequent exchanges of high official, started with Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington in February 2013, frequent meetings of foreign ministers and Japan - U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (so called two plus two') in Tokyo, in October 2013. In spite of the complexity of the issue of the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, further steps were made towards its realization. Also, Japan tried to support and meet needs of its rebalancing toward Asia Pacific.

When it comes to the second pillar - cooperation with neighbouring countries - could be also seen as reinforcement of the US rebalancing, as those countries are seen as 'partners'. The first foreign visit and high in Japan's diplomatic agenda is cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which in 2013 experienced the 40th year of cooperation that was celebrated in December 2013 in Tokyo at special, the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit. Both, Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida met with all ten ASEAN countries' relevant partners since taking the offices in an attempt to 'further strengthen cooperative relationship' with each of them individually. High on this agenda come relations with India and Australia with which Japan shares 'universal values and strategic interests' that enables deepening cooperation in various fields, especially in economy and security. After them, relations with Russian Federation, People's Republic of China and Republic of Korea were listed as 'very important'. Bilateral relations with China were modestly described as 'one of most important' (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2014), and both countries responsible for peace and stability in the region and globally. Japan's intentions to pursue improvement on the basic principle of 'mutually beneficial relationship, based on common strategic interests' were reasoned as for the benefits of both countries and the region.

The document further explores Japan's intention to strengthen economic diplomacy as a tool to support *Abenomics* thru different economic frameworks and partnerships - from TPP, RCEP, FTA with China and ROK, Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and promotion of 'infrastructure system exports true "top-level sales" initiatives', with the help of newly established Headquarters for the Promotion of Japanese Business Support within Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013, the strategic utilization of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and similar measures supported by the state. Additionally, Japan plans to use the existing frameworks of G8, G20, APEC, WTO, OECD, Paris Club, etc. to strengthen its presence and provide assistance to its economy's recovery. Japan also pledged to continue its engagement towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear

weapons, starting from supporting the frameworks of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by UN General Assembly in June 2013, on the initiative of Japan.

Practical aspect of Abe's foreign policy is firstly marked by its very extensive substance, as so far, for the first twenty five months in the office he visited fifty two countries, which is unprecedented for any of his predecessors. His intensive style may be marked with the highlights when Japan being given the hosting of the Olympics and Paralympics Games in 2020 in September 2013 and the darkest moments during the and after fatal outcome of the Islamic State militants' execution of the two Japanese hostages (Kurtenbach, Yamaguchi, 2015). While on the one side, intense diplomatic activity of the Prime Minister was seen very positively, although criticized, it was even mocked by some observers inside and outside of Japan (Ono and Honda, 2014), who primarily noticed intensity of his foreign activity and its tracks that very often followed path of the visits done by Chinese president and prime minister (Ford, 2014).

On the other hand, it was also highly praised behaviour, for many reasons, starting with the fact that many visits, including his visits to all ASEAN member states during the first year in office were seen as strategic focusing into close neighbourhood. Also, his foreign minister, Kishida Fumio visited all ten ASEAN member states. Abe's visits were seen as positive and welcomed move by those states and ASEAN, as this region – paradoxically - was neglected by previous Japanese prime ministers and during that decade of negligence China stepped in boldly as an investor and trading partner and by other numerous ways of cooperation through the framework 'ASEAN plus One'. Although Japan appointed an ambassador to ASEAN, resident in Jakarta in 2010, and took part in dialogues and various activities in 'ASEAN plus Three' framework, Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asian Summit (EAS), Mekong-Japan Summit, etc, it was not competitive enough to preserve the leadership in the region that it built after the Vietnam War. At the time applied the Fukuda Doctrine focused Japanese strategy to the South East Asia region and through its rich set of measures created strong link between Japanese strategic foreign policy aims and economic development. Japanese aid to the region focused on the key ASEAN countries and contributed to growth of Japanese investments and trade with the region and generally, while during the last decade Japan was more inward oriented and constrained by its internal problems, as its foreign regional engagement was more oriented towards China and DPR of Korea issues. When calling for the 'renaissance' of the Fukuda Doctrine, analysts suggest that current available ODA resources are much more limited than at the time, which require sharing the burden of aid to the region with the USA and other willing donors.

It was apparent that Japan needed to fulfil gaps emerged behind, give incentives to the trade with the block and bilaterally, increase investment and ODA programs that benefited both sides as it particularly included small and medium Japanese firms, that were in position to boost their businesses that will help Japanese economy recovery and *Abenomics*, and at the same time to give impetus to local development in the relevant ASEAN countries by spreading technological advantages there. On the other hand, ODA funds were used, for the first time for ‘strategic reasons’, to provide some military equipment or equipment that could and is planned to be used in such purpose, to the countries that lie along important sea lanes and (happen to) have been in escalating territorial misunderstanding with China (Shinizo, 2014).

First foreign trip of Prime Minister Abe happened to be to three ASEAN countries, instead one to Washington, which was his prime wanted designation and which he realized in February.⁸ He also visited Russia, Mongolia, United Kingdom, NATO Head Quarters, France, Poland, took part of the ‘Vishegrad Group’ summit and other destinations by which he attracted a lot of attention with the intensity of his performance in the scope Japan’s diplomacy. In 2013, his first year in the office, Abe visited the following countries for bilateral visits or took part in the international mechanisms’ events there:

January - Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, February – USA, March – Mongolia, April - Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, May – the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, June - G8 Summit (Great Britain), Poland, Ireland, Great Britain, July - Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, August - Bahrain, Kuwait, Djibouti, Qatar, September - Canada, UN General Assembly, G20 Summit (Saint Petersburg), IOC General Committee (Russia and Argentine), October - Turkey, APEC Summit (Bali, Indonesia), ASEAN Summit (Brunei), November – the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. During 2014, Prime Minister Abe performed the next foreign visits: January – Republic of India, Davos Conference (the Swiss Confederation), the Sultanate of Oman, Cote d’Ivoire, the Republic of Mozambique, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, February - Sochi Olympic Opening (Russian Federation), March - Nuclear Security Summit (the Kingdom of Netherlands), April-May – the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, May – the Republic of Singapore, June - the Kingdom of Belgium, the Italian Republic, July - Mexico, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Chile, the Federative Republic of Brazil, New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, Papua New Guinea, September - UN General Assembly, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Democratic Socialist Republic

⁸Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga informed the press that PM Abe had hoped to first visit Washington in order to strengthen Japan’s alliance with the United States, but the visit was postponed due to President Barack Obama’s tight schedule and the first visit turned out to be this way.

of Sri Lanka, October - ASEM Summit (Milan, Italy), November - APEC Summit (Beijing, PR China), ASEAN Summit (the Republic of the Union of Myanmar), G20 Summit (Brisbane, Australia). In January 2015, he visited Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian territories.

When visiting Latin America, Prime Minister Abe was also looking for support for Japanese bid for the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council that was going to be decided upon autumn 2015. He was particularly targeted CARICOM as a powerful voting block in international organizations and within OUN family and its member states, six of which do not recognize PRC, but Taiwan, where he sought for understanding and support for the bid. That support he also asked from his hosts during visits to South Asian countries, even competing candidates, such as Bangladesh and from Sri Lanka and during visit of the Indian PM in August 2014. Although very close to Japan and positioned near sea lanes through which more than 80% of imported LNG and oil is transferred to Japan, these states were not visited by Japanese prime ministers for twenty four years – Sri Lanka – and after almost a decade to Bangladesh. All the visits were consisted of several elements – intensifying or rebuilding political bilateral relations, including security dimension where in many of them he introduced or tried to introduce ‘two-plus-two’ model at the top level (Richards, 2014) (prime ministers plus ministers of Defence), practiced for years in Japanese-USA bilateral summits and is primarily concentrated on security issues, as well as including elements *Abenomics* with attempts to intensify trade, Japanese investments and generally to open field for Japanese corporations, and because of that on those trips Abe was accompanied with over seventy of the business representatives.

His critiques pointed that wherever he went it was in a way too late in the sense that relations were neglected as there were no high-level visits during long periods, and where meanwhile China, as power-house, strongly stepped in as an economic partner and source of generous loans and donations thus winning hearts of the local governments and partly people and at the late our Japans tries to do the same. Numbers and figures showing this reality are genuine, but Abe did something to change it towards Japanese interests. Obvious new reality is, on the other hand, that GDP of PRC is worth nine trillion US\$, and one of Japan is five trillion and it is not possible nor wise for Japan to compete with China on the terms of which each RMB Yuan should be followed by eighteen Yen of investments or assistance. Japan should follow its own path and strategic goals when approaching them. In that sense, both – extensiveness and contents of Abe's visits have had positive results, even though he was ‘trailing the steps’ of the Chinese leaders.

The other argument of those who criticized him, and where we could agree with them, points that in spite of all that extensive diplomatic activity stuffed with economic diplomacy there have been no highest level meetings with the most important Asian neighbours and economic partners in the region – People's

Republic of China and Republic of Korea (Ono and Honda, 2014). PM Abe in fact met with South Korean president Park in the Hague in March 2014, in the trilateral framework that was organized and insisted upon by USA president Barak Obama, on the sidelines of the Nuclear Summit, but the event did not bring any progress in melting the antagonism carefully nurtured by Korean side (Ennis, 2014), for the reasons of internal politics – pre election one and personal legacy of the first lady president in Korea (McCurry, 2012), one of the Asian “princelets”. Looking from a distance and angle of political realism it is not easy to explain why territorial and historical discords grew to the level of becoming such a serious obstacle to the improvement of the relations between two crucial USA allies in this part of the world. All Japanese attempts towards improvements met cold response. Although Japan is the second biggest Korean trade partner, while ROK is the fourth biggest for Japan, it did not affect the ongoing political frictions that Seoul has been insisted on. China is Japan’s leading trading partner, with bilateral trade between the two valued over 332US\$ billion in 2012, according to *the World Trade Organization’s Trade Profiles 2013 report*. Japan-South Korea trade was worth over 103US\$ billion in the same period, making South Korea Japan’s fourth largest trading partner, after USA and the EU. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea are China’s third and fourth largest trading partners, with total trade in 2012 valued at 332US\$ billion and 257US\$ billion respectively. Finally, for South Korea, China is the biggest trade partner and Japan is the second. Beyond the issue of the so called ‘sex slavery’, there has been territorial issues regarding the island of Takeshima/Dokdo island and name of Sea of Japan, that ROK insists on renaming to ‘East Sea’.

The positive elements amid the wave of negative developments between the three East Asian economic giants, which combined economies make 20% of the global GDP and trade share make 17.5% of the global trade, survives all the expressions of animosities are free trade talks on the ministerial level, that are planned to be finalized sooner than Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP).

Relations with other Korean state were one of the mentioned biggest challenges that according to Abe Doctrine – its security part – asked for Japan’s adjustment, as latest expressions of PDR of Korea’s nuclear and military abilities pose the security threat to East Asia. Abe’s cabinet tried to soften the North Korean leadership by several semi-secretive missions sent to Pyongyang and Mongolia for talks that were primarily dealt with the case of abductees, and which primary aim was to make the regime in North Korea more dependent on the Japanese aid.

One of the goals of PM Abe’s visit to Russia in April 2012 - that was the first such visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to this country in ten years - was to establish personal relations with Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, as he announced. During the next six months they had another four meeting on different occasions. In November 2013, the first Japan-Russia Joint Foreign and Defence

Ministerial Consultations were held in the 'two plus two' framework. But, Japan ended being among few nations that imposed economic sanctions on Russia on the pretext of the events in Ukraine. Prime Minister Abe in that sense demonstrated sort of self-denying manner of fulfilling his announced goals, which is especially harmful to Japanese interest when it comes to Russia and importance of Russia for Japan. It is very hard to see this as an attempt to revitalize the relations that are highly promising in the sense of economy within the context of the North-East Asia and so important for Japan in strategic sense regarding solving the issue of the North Territories/South Kurils Islands and concluding a peace treaty. Regarding the importance of Russia globally and as an regional factor in energy field, the border issues, Six Party Talks, APEK, East Asia Summit and other bilateral and multilateral highly important mechanisms, processes and issues, following the path marked by the USA proved here to be harmful to Japan, but the question was if Japanese government was capable or allowed to create a space for Japan to occasionally make some distance from that path. In this case, it is not unreasonable to expect the respond from the Russian side towards the negative impact that was done by such behaviour of PM Abe's government. On the other hand, president Putin's political realism creates some area of optimism and even opened slightly a door for improvement of the personal relations⁹ and bilateral relations.

The problem with bilateral relations of Japan with China is huge one – it damaged significantly economies of both countries.¹⁰ It already made many representatives of Japanese businesses to move their premises from China towards countries of ASEAN and even to other continents. The prolonged tensions have very bad political impact and contribute to the worsening of the security in East Asia making it very dangerous. Abe has additionally angered Beijing with his revisionist views on Japan's wartime conduct in China and specifically regarding women used as sex slaves, robust claims that he expressed to the Senkaku/Diyao islands issue, as well as a visit in December 2013 to Yasukuni shrine, regarded by China and South Korea as a symbol of Japanese militarism. His continuous criticisms on numerous public occasions of China's conduct - from human rights,

⁹ Thanks to mediation of the former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and his personal ties with V. V. Putin, Russian president and Japanese PM, in spite of the current developments, exchanged birthday congratulation phone conversations on the relevant dates (September 21 – PM Abe's birthday and October 7th – President Putin's). This was revealed to the public in Mr. Mori's speech at the Yomiuri Shimbun International Economic Society, held in October 2014, in Tokyo.

¹⁰ According to the Japan External Trade Organization, in 2013 investments by Japanese companies in China shrunk by a third. The Chinese Commerce Ministry said that Japans DI in China fell even more in 2014 with a 38% decline from the year before to 4.33US\$ billion. During the same period, Japanese FDI in the rest of Asia climbed for 21%, and particularly so in the Philippines – for 70%. Diplomatic tensions with Republic of Korea had similar impact on FDI data – in 2013 Japanese FDI fell 18%, but recovered in the first quarter of 2014 with rebound of 43% to the value of 1.1 billion US\$.

respect of law, behaviour in South China Sea, etc. - coined strong animosity on the other side of the East China Sea. It only fortified their view of him as a conservative and militaristically oriented. The territorial dispute Senkaku/Diyao Islands is so high on the Chinese leadership agenda that this importance made them almost totally inflexible towards Abe's attempts to soften it for creating some room for the summit between the two leaders – president Xi Jinping and himself during the APEC summit. Until the last moment, all three semi-secretive missions did not prove to make any progress as Chinese position remained strong and filled with accusations towards Abe personally. His decision to appoint Sadakazu Tanigaki as LDP's secretary general, and veteran MP Toshihiro Nikai as his deputy, drew a moderately optimistic response from Beijing and raised hopes that the two neighbours could improve ties. Chinese president Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe eventually hold formal talks on November 10, 2013 during the APEC summit in Beijing, for the first time since the two leaders took office, as a very modest, but positive small step.

Some diplomatic sources in Beijing claim that Chinese aim is to press Tokyo continuously and harshly until it will be ready to admit that there is Senkaku/Diyao issue (and, presumably accept the dual control over the islands). Japanese position is that there is no issue, that the islands are under Japanese control and accordingly Japanese territory, while China strongly claims the ownership of it, and such an opposite stands make the outcome and solution to this very serious cause of conflict highly uncertain. Further more, current situation gives room for the future development of the dangerous incidents that could lead to more serious events, even clashes or other more serious combat activities that would endanger peace in East Asia and would have made negative impact on the Asia-Pacific and even global peace and security. One of the most dangerous situation happened during Chinese-Russian maritime drills in the East China Sea when Japanese surveillance plane and electronic intelligence aircraft were scrambled by Chinese fighters within the Chinese declared air defence zone over the disputed islands in May 2014. Similar situations happened 415 times in 2013, up 36% from the previous year, while both countries patrols ships and different vessels were playing dangerous games in the waters around the islands, raising regional fear that one of the incidents could lead to an accidental clash that could spark even more dangerous developments.

After having approved the export of parts for a surface-to-air missile system to the United States and joint Japanese-British research on missile technology for fighter jets, in October 2014 Japan positively responded to Australian request to start the talks on joint cooperation in submarine development. If positively decided, that would not only mean transfer of highly sensitive 'top secret' technology of Soryu-class submarines to Australia in 2030, but also upgrading security cooperation with the nation that 'maintains closest and highest levels of security cooperation with Japan, except for the United States' to another level, above the usual and regular

common drills, and very likely also to transform it into trilateral USA-Japan-Australian project. This could be realized as Australia would like to equip the submarines with US's cruise missiles and other communication equipment and trilateral talks were held during the G 20 summit in November 16 2014, in Brisbane. Although the three sides keep each other for the closest allies against the China's continuing advance into the Pacific and Indian oceans it was their first trilateral summit in seven years.

In the early 1990s Japan established the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process aimed at assisting African economies and support cooperation with them. In June 2013, the Fifth TICAD was organized in Yokohama, while Abe visited several African countries in January 2014 with the intention to make known assistance package that should give humanitarian aid and support business capacity building. Abe has been visiting Middle Eastern countries, which are sources of over 80% of Japan's crude oil import and about 29% of its natural gas import couple of times, offering sales of nuclear technology and energy industries, offering humanitarian and other forms of assistance, and promising to stand with countries that fight against terrorism. The region will remain of the highest strategic importance to Japan, as Abe promised to continue the situation were together with North Africa it remains a destination of much overseas development assistance, worth 1.5US\$ billion in 2012.

When it comes to Central Asia, Japan initiated the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue of foreign ministers in 2004. The administration of Abe is aiming to increase Japan's presence there, where China's economic, political and cultural influence has been growing. Even though, Japan's presence remained only within the framework that put five Central Asian countries together. The latest, fifth, meeting of the 'five plus Japan' framework was held in Bishkek, under the widest framework of 'proactive pacifism' and Tokyo's plan of promoting peace and stability in the region. Japan initiated cooperation in agriculture true offering advanced farming techniques to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as well as some road infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and border control between three of the countries and Afghanistan to prevent drug smuggling and terrorist over-spills.

In Japan's 'Panoramic foreign policy' so far there has been no specific place for the countries in the South-Eastern Europe, including Serbia, where increase of the Chinese economic presence has been very obvious recently and where Japan has traditionally good reputation, but too modest economic and political presence.

On the other hand, soft power as element also explored in the numerous published papers with the Doctrine, was much less visible so far in Abe's acts and words, although it was the second leg and of the Japanese post-war global acceptance and respected and widely recognized element of its identity. Japan has won its place

as significant global nation with already established impressive soft power, with huge influence on a cultural level, one of the biggest world donor nations, it is so important beyond its economic significance of the second or lately third biggest world economy, technological power-house, investor and financial big power, development model for all successful Asian tigers and little dragons, and rising economic powers in Asia and globally. Nevertheless, the investment in hard power is what worries many in the region and sown the seed of scepticism among those who might accept the rest of it. Soft power is within the Abe Doctrine, but ‘Cool Japan’ has not been seen a lot in practice, while strengthening of hard power through different elements that rose concern inside and outside Japan was very obvious.

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Dragana MITROVIĆ

ABEOVA DOKTRINA I JAPANSKA SPOLJNA POLITIKA

Apstrakt: Pokušavajući da sačuva opšti okvir japanske posleratne spoljne i bezbednosne politike, premijer Abe je započeo njihove složene i kontroverzne promene koje su istovremeno izazvale podršku, ali i oštre kritike u zemlji i inostranstvu. Njegov kontekst “aktivnog doprinosa miru” s jedne strane uneo je dinamiku u rebalans moći u azijsko-pacifičkom regionu, a s druge strane naglasio regionalnu i globalnu ulogu Japana.

Ključne reči: Abe Šinzo, Abeova doktrina, „aktivni doprinos miru“.

Received: 20.1.2015.

Revised: 20.2.2015.

Accepted: 4.3.2015.