Institutional power and the rise of Milošević

Abstract

The argument about the centrality of political programme in Milošević's ascent deserves a careful scrutiny not only because it has long served as a dominant interpretation of these historical events, but also since it reflects broader debates on political developments in the region and the nature of power structure in socialist party-states in general and Yugoslavia in particular. The political programme thesis draws on, and provides support for, the prevailing views on the conflicts surrounding the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which focus on nationalist strategies of political actors and institutional arrangements and informal elite practices that regulated inter-ethnic and inter-regional relations. The thesis also reflects a dominant view on the nature of power structure in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s. According to this view, sudden personality shifts at the top were unlikely to occur without a profound conflict over policy because Yugoslavia featured collective leadership at all levels as a result of the institutional legacy and elite settlement, which had been cemented early in the previous decade. Consequently, without a new programme persuasive to high party officials or population at large, Milošević would not have been able to change power relations in the higher party echelons and purge powerful rivals from leadership.