Institucionalni uslovi konkurencije političkih ideja u Srbiji: Slučaj Regulatornog tela za elektronske medije

Abstract

Основно истраживачко питање на које аутори у раду настоје да одговоре је јесу ли институционални услови у српском друштву такви да омогућавају конкуренцију политичких идеја и видљивост различитих политичких опција у јавној сфери. Разматрањем правне утемељености контроверзног (не)чињења Регулаторног тела за електронске медије (РЕМ) поводом кампање за председничке изборе у Србији 2017. године и његове интерпретације сопствене улоге аутори указују на постојање услова производње ексклузивне слике света што су били налази и истраживача политичке и изборне комуникације још после одржаних првих парламентарних избора након обнове вишестраначја у Србији почетком последње деценије прошлога века. Аутори указују на конкретне мере у деловању РЕМ-а којима би се допринело квалитету изборне и политичке комуникације.

This paper examines the institutional conditions of the Serbian society for existing of the competition of political ideas and visibility of different political options in the public sphere. In the first part, two phases of the Regulatory Agency for Electronic Media (REM) in Serbia are identified. First, period from its establishment in 2003 until the adoption of media laws in 2014, and second, from 2014 onward. In the first phase, REM almost exclusively dealt with election campaigns, despite having many other topics to regulate by adoption of bylaws (such as protection of minors, copyright and other). In its second phase, especially during the Presidential election campaign in 2017, REM suddenly decided not to monitor the work of providers of audiovisual media services, but to react to complaints instead. The official ratio behind it was that there were no sanctions prescribed under the Law on Electronic Media, but also that the Law on Elections of Members of Parliament should deal with the media during electoral campaign. In the second part, the opposite interpretation of the Law on Electronic Media (LEM) is offered. Article 47, Para 1, Point 5. prescribes that there should be “equal representation without discrimination to registered political parties, coalitions and individual candidates during the election campaign”. Further on, Article 28 of LEM introduces measures for REM to enforce when providers of audiovisual services breach the rule of equal representation without discrimination. Those are rejection of the application for extension of the licence for offering of audiovisual services and not-issuing of the licence when in doubt that the provider of audiovisual services would not fulfil obligations related, among others, to equal presentation without discrimination of political actors during the election campaign. The final part of the research concludes that institutionalized conditions in Serbia do not allow competition of political ideas. It also determines that the role of the entire society, together with political elites, should be to strengthen independent institutions that monitor the work of the media, especially during election campaigns. To conclude, the proper regulation of media scene and implementation of such a regulatory framework has traditionally been completed when under pressure from abroad, only. The first drive was given by Council of Europe (CoE), for media laws passed in 2002 and 2003, as their adoption was one of the requirements for Serbia to become the CoE Member State. After Serbia has become the one, European Union has taken over the carrot and stick, so that major media documents,such as Media Strategy in 2011 or new package of media laws in 2014, were adopted as preconditions for Serbia to make a step forward on its European path. Therefore, shall we expect that the regulatory authority becomes a strong and independent Regulator, only when Serbia becomes close enough to its EU membership, so that such a body remains one of the prerequisites for Serbia to become the full member of the European Union?