Is morality possible for Theodor Adorno

Abstract

This paper examines the possibility of morality in Theodor Adorno's ethics in two aspects. Firstly, it deals with his claim about the impossibility of leading a right life within the radically evil social world. The second issue that is addressed is the viability of Adornian normative ethics. It is concluded that, although the state of affairs of contemporary society does not allow truly moral agency, there is still a way of distinguishing between the right and wrong moral choices. This is examined by comparing the examples Adorno gives in his lectures - the moral decisions of Gregers Werle (one of Henrik Ibsen's protagonist) and the anonymous officer who was among the conspirators of the 20 July plot to assassinate Adolph Hitler. Furthermore, it is argued that Adorno offers a thin normative, deontological and particularistic account of morality that puts the emphasis on the dialectical and critical approach to examining the moral facts and making a moral decision.

Ovaj rad na dva načina ispituje mogućnost postojanja moralnosti u etici Teodora Adorna. Prvo, razmatra njegovu tvrdnju o nemogućnosti vođenja ispravnog života u radikalno zlom društvenom svetu. Drugo, rad se bavi normativnošću Adornove etike. Zaključuje se da, iako stanje stvari u savremenom društvu ne omogućava istinsko moralno postupanje, ipak postoji način na koji je moguće razlikovati ispravne od neispravnih moralnih izbora. Ovaj je zaključak podržan poređenjem primera koje Adorno nudi u svojim predavanjima - moralnih odluka Gregersa Verla (jednog od protagonista Henrika Ibzena) i anonimnog oficira koji je učestvovao u događajima 20. jula 1944. godine, zaveri koja je za cilj imala atentat na Adolfa Hitlera. Na kraju, tvrdi se da Adorno nudi ograničeno normativno, deontološko i partikularističko viđenje moralnosti koje naglašava dijalektički i kritički pristup ispitivanju moralnih činjenica i donošenju moralnih odluka.