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Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings

Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi

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2011
331.pdf (1.282Mb)
Authors
Pavlović, Dušan
Stanojević, Ivan N.
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
The paper is an extension of our study on analysis of laws regulating relations between parliament and executive body in carrying out economic, particularly fiscal policy. This time, the influence of parliament to fiscal policy is measured empirically. In difference from results of the previous study, which showed that the Assembly exercised a relatively high influence to fiscal policy, here we show that the situation in practice is opposite the Government of Serbia has large power in carrying out fiscal policy, where as the influence of the Assembly of Serbia is negligible. The influence of legislative body is measured through analysis of two (out of six) indicators - power of submission of amendment sand budget reversion.
Tekst predstavlja nastavak naše studije o analizi zakona koji uređuju odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela uvođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike. Ovoga puta uticaj parlamenta na fiskalnu politiku merimo empirijski. Za razliku od rezultata iz prethodne studije, gde se pokazalo da Skupština ima relativno veliki uticaj na fiskalnu politiku, ovde pokazujemo da je u praksi situacija obrnuta - Vlada Srbije ima veliku moć u vođenju fiskalne politike, dok Skupština Srbije ima zanemarljivi uticaj. Uticaj zakonodavnog tela merimo kroz analizu dva (od ukupno šest) indikatora-moć podnošenja amandmana i reverzija budžeta.
Keywords:
budget / budget dilemma / executive power / legislative power / economic policy / fiscal policy / public consumption / parliamentarism / proportional electoral system / budžet / budžetska dilema / izvršna vlast / zakonodavna vlast / ekonomska politika / fiskalna politika / javna potrošnja / parlamentarizam / proporcionalni izborni sistem
Source:
Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 2011, 5, 6, 177-194
Publisher:
  • Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
Funding / projects:
  • Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in the Process of Nation-State Building - The Case of Serbia (RS-47026)

ISSN: 1820-6700

[ Google Scholar ]
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_334
URI
http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/334
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researchers' papers
Institution/Community
FPN
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Stanojević, Ivan N.
PY  - 2011
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/334
AB  - The paper is an extension of our study on analysis of laws regulating relations between parliament and executive body in carrying out economic, particularly fiscal policy. This time, the influence of parliament to fiscal policy is measured empirically. In difference from results of the previous study, which showed that the Assembly exercised a relatively high influence to fiscal policy, here we show that the situation in practice is opposite the Government of Serbia has large power in carrying out fiscal policy, where as the influence of the Assembly of Serbia is negligible. The influence of legislative body is measured through analysis of two (out of six) indicators - power of submission of amendment sand budget reversion.
AB  - Tekst predstavlja nastavak naše studije o analizi zakona koji uređuju odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela uvođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike. Ovoga puta uticaj parlamenta na fiskalnu politiku merimo empirijski. Za razliku od rezultata iz prethodne studije, gde se pokazalo da Skupština ima relativno veliki uticaj na fiskalnu politiku, ovde pokazujemo da je u praksi situacija obrnuta - Vlada Srbije ima veliku moć u vođenju fiskalne politike, dok Skupština Srbije ima zanemarljivi uticaj. Uticaj zakonodavnog tela merimo kroz analizu dva (od ukupno šest) indikatora-moć podnošenja amandmana i reverzija budžeta.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
T2  - Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
T1  - Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings
T1  - Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi
EP  - 194
IS  - 6
SP  - 177
VL  - 5
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Stanojević, Ivan N.",
year = "2011",
abstract = "The paper is an extension of our study on analysis of laws regulating relations between parliament and executive body in carrying out economic, particularly fiscal policy. This time, the influence of parliament to fiscal policy is measured empirically. In difference from results of the previous study, which showed that the Assembly exercised a relatively high influence to fiscal policy, here we show that the situation in practice is opposite the Government of Serbia has large power in carrying out fiscal policy, where as the influence of the Assembly of Serbia is negligible. The influence of legislative body is measured through analysis of two (out of six) indicators - power of submission of amendment sand budget reversion., Tekst predstavlja nastavak naše studije o analizi zakona koji uređuju odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela uvođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike. Ovoga puta uticaj parlamenta na fiskalnu politiku merimo empirijski. Za razliku od rezultata iz prethodne studije, gde se pokazalo da Skupština ima relativno veliki uticaj na fiskalnu politiku, ovde pokazujemo da je u praksi situacija obrnuta - Vlada Srbije ima veliku moć u vođenju fiskalne politike, dok Skupština Srbije ima zanemarljivi uticaj. Uticaj zakonodavnog tela merimo kroz analizu dva (od ukupno šest) indikatora-moć podnošenja amandmana i reverzija budžeta.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd",
journal = "Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka",
title = "Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings, Političke institucije i ekonomska politika - empirijski nalazi",
pages = "194-177",
number = "6",
volume = "5"
}
Pavlović, D.,& Stanojević, I. N.. (2011). Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd., 5(6), 177-194.
Pavlović D, Stanojević IN. Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings. in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka. 2011;5(6):177-194..
Pavlović, Dušan, Stanojević, Ivan N., "Political institutions and economic policy: Empirical findings" in Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka, 5, no. 6 (2011):177-194.

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