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Teorija igara u Levijatanu Tomasa Hobsa

dc.creatorPavlović, Dušan
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-02T12:13:28Z
dc.date.available2021-04-02T12:13:28Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1820-6700
dc.identifier.urihttp://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/537
dc.description.abstractFor a long time, political theorists who deployed game theory have believed that Hobbes's state of nature can be expressed as a Prisoner's dilemma in which war of all against all is a Pareto-inferior outcome of social cooperation. Some recent game theory studies have looked at the state of nature from a perspective of chicken game and assurance game. Assurance game seems to be more precise in explaining how individuals in Hobbes's state of nature overcome the conflict and establish cooperation. In assurance game, cooperation is established by credible signaling that assures other players that everyone is prepared to cooperate. If all players do the same, and they all know it, individuals can achieve a Pareto-superior outcome.en
dc.description.abstractPolitički teoretičari su dugo smatrali da Hobsovo prirodno stanje može da se objasni zatvorenikovom dilemom u kojoj rat svih protiv sviju predstavlja Pareto-inferioran ishod društvene saradnje. Nedavni radovi teoretičari igara analizirali su prirodno stanje iz ugla igre kukavice i igre uveravanja (assurance game). Pokazalo se da igra uveravanja preciznije objašnjava način na koji pojedinci prevazilaze sukob u prirodnom stanju i uspostavljaju saradnju. U ovoj igri, suština prevazilaženja sukoba predstavlja kredibilno signaliziranje kojim drugu stranu uveravate da ste spremni na saradnju. Ako pojedinci ispune taj uslov, i znaju da su ga svi drugi ispunili, moguć je prelazak iz Pareto-inferiornog u Pareto-optimalno stanje.sr
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu - Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceGodišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka
dc.subjectThomas Hobbesen
dc.subjectLeviathanen
dc.subjectprisoner's dilemmaen
dc.subjectassurance gameen
dc.subjectPareto optimumen
dc.subjectTomas Hobssr
dc.subjectLevijatansr
dc.subjectzatvorenikova dilemasr
dc.subjectigra uveravanjasr
dc.subjectPareto-optimumsr
dc.titleGame theory in Hobbes's Leviathanen
dc.titleTeorija igara u Levijatanu Tomasa Hobsasr
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseARR
dc.citation.epage150
dc.citation.issue13
dc.citation.other9(13): 135-150
dc.citation.rankM51
dc.citation.spage135
dc.citation.volume9
dc.identifier.doi10.5937/GodFPN1513135P
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/347/534.pdf
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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