Perfect and imperfect obligations towards poverty

Abstract

The article deals with the nature of obligations toward alleviation of state of poverty. Starting points in the analysis are Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and reinterpretation of the distinction in Onora O'Neill's ethics of obligations. Obligations toward alleviation of poverty are generally considered as imperfect, because it is impossible to specify correlative right to goods and services we are obliged to provide to the poor. For this reason, these obligations are classified as a part of ethics of virtues, not ethics of rights. According to this view, conditions of implementation are inherent part of justification of obligation. This interpretation of conditions of implementation is rejected and relaxed in theories of Thomas Pogge and Amarya Sen. According to author of the article, flaws in the architecture of analyzed theories, as well as, undeveloped insights of their authors suggest that the best way to articulate obligations toward alleviation of poverty is to understand them as indirect perfect obligations.

Tekst se bavi karakterom obaveza prema smanjenju siromaštva. Polazne tačka u analizi su Kantovo razlikovanje potpunih i nepotpunih dužnosti i rekonceptualizacija ovog razlikovanja unutar etike dužnosti Onore O'Nil. Obaveze prema siromašnima smatraju se nesavršenim obavezama jer ne može se potpuno specifikovati korelativno pravo siromašnih na obezbeđivanje dobara i usluga. Zbog toga obaveze prema siromašnima spadaju u etiku vrlina, ne etiku prava. Prema ovom shvatanju, uslovi ispunjenja su sastavni deo opravdanja obaveze. Ovako protumačen uslov ispunjenja obaveza osporen je i relaksiran u teorijama Tomasa Pogea i Amartje Sena. Prema autoru, nedostaci u arhitektonici analiziranih teorija, kao i nedorečeni sporadični uvidi analiziranih autora ukazuju da je smanjenje siromaštva najbolje formulisati kao indirektnu savršenu obavezu.