Assurance game in large groups: Economic examples

Abstract

I apply game theory to economic problems in large groups (more than two players). I focus on the coordination problem of collective action within assurance game. Coordinative failure in such games is a consequence of the expectation concerning what the other players will do. The prevailing pessimism about the actions of others creates "bad equilibrium," while the prevailing optimism about the actions of others creates "good equilibrium." I look into three examples: students' self-grading, fiscal stimulus, and the absence of investments in undeveloped economies. The main insight is that the coordination failure problem may be solved by state intervention - by way of fiscal stimulus or coordination agent who creates a focal point among consumers and producers.

U ovom tekstu primenjujem teoriju igara na ekonomske probleme u velikim grupama (više od dva igrača). Fokusiram se na problem koordinacije kolek-tivnog delanja unutar igre uveravanja. koordinacioni nedostaci u nekoj ko-lektivnoj radnji proizvod su očekivanja o tome šta će uraditi druge osobe. Pesimizam o radnjama drugih stvara "lošu" ravnotežu, dok optimizam stva-ra "dobru" ravnotežu. igru analiziram na tri primera: studentsko samooce-njivanje, fiskalni podsticaj i odsustvo investicija u nerazvijenim privredama. glavni zaključak je da problem koordinacionih nedostataka može da se reši državnom intervencijom-fiskalnim podsticajima ili koordinacionim telom koje stvara fokalnu tačku za potrošače i proizvođače.