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The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918

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2021
Anali2021_16.pdf (264.4Kb)
Authors
Pavlović, Dušan
Đurašković, Stevo
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the Yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the Receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the Receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of Frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the Yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the Yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept th...e Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. First, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.

Keywords:
ultimatum game / emotions
Source:
Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju, 2021, 18, 1, 345-368
Publisher:
  • Hrvatsko politološko društvo

DOI: 10.20901/an.18.15

ISSN: 1845-6707

Scopus: 2-s2.0-85123617782
[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/838
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researchers' papers
Institution/Community
FPN
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pavlović, Dušan
AU  - Đurašković, Stevo
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/838
AB  - We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian
Cabinet and the Yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs
from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical
(rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the Receiver is satisfied with
any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game
theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction
in the Receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe
this behavior in the emotional behavior of Frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the
leaders of the Yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum
game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić who
opposed any concessions to the Yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum
to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was
harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces
two conclusions. First, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt
themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.
PB  - Hrvatsko politološko društvo
T2  - Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju
T1  - The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918
EP  - 368
IS  - 1
SP  - 345
VL  - 18
DO  - 10.20901/an.18.15
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Pavlović, Dušan and Đurašković, Stevo",
year = "2021",
abstract = "We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian
Cabinet and the Yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs
from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical
(rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the Receiver is satisfied with
any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game
theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction
in the Receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe
this behavior in the emotional behavior of Frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the
leaders of the Yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum
game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić who
opposed any concessions to the Yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum
to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was
harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces
two conclusions. First, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt
themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.",
publisher = "Hrvatsko politološko društvo",
journal = "Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju",
title = "The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918",
pages = "368-345",
number = "1",
volume = "18",
doi = "10.20901/an.18.15"
}
Pavlović, D.,& Đurašković, S.. (2021). The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918. in Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju
Hrvatsko politološko društvo., 18(1), 345-368.
https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.15
Pavlović D, Đurašković S. The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918. in Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju. 2021;18(1):345-368.
doi:10.20901/an.18.15 .
Pavlović, Dušan, Đurašković, Stevo, "The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game: An Example from the History of Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1914-1918" in Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju, 18, no. 1 (2021):345-368,
https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.15 . .

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