Izborne jedinice i raspodela mandata u izbornom sistemu

Abstract

Four electoral cycles for the National Assembly of Serbia, with two different electoral models, simulating the real electoral results in variations of electoral census 3% and 5% and one electoral unit did not confirm expectations of political actors who were promoters of such electoral solutions. Proportional electoral models would produce three parties, in best case five party parliamentary structure and eliminate small parties and national minorities- parties from division of mandates. This electoral model would lead to smaller fragmentation, than models with larger numbers of smaller electoral units, which would make parties moderate in order to gain coalition partners. If that would not happen that model would often lead to extraordinary elections.

Četiri izborna ciklusa za Narodnu skupštinu Srbije, sa dva različita izborna modela, simulacijom realnih izbornih rezultata u varijantama izbornog cenzusa 3 % i 5 % i jedne izborne jedinice nisu potvrdi očekivanja političkih aktera koji su bili promoteri takvih izbornih rešenja. Proporcionalni izborni modeli sa jednom izbornom jedinicom proizveli bi trostranačku, u najboljem slučaju petostranačku parlamentarnu strukturu i eliminisali male stranke i stranke nacionalnih manjina iz raspodele mandata. Ovakav izborni model vodio bi manjoj fragmentaciji, nego modeli sa većim brojem manjih izbornih jedinica, što bi parlamentarne stranke primoravalo na umerenost radi pridobijanja koalicionih partnera. Ako bi to izostalo ovakav model vodio bi čestim prevremenim izborima.