Uloga istorijskih analogija u spoljnoj politici: SAD, operacija Deliberate Force 1995. i vazdušni napadi NATO na SRJ 1999. godine

Abstract

U vreme donošenja odluke o otpočinjanju vazdušnih napada na Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju, marta 1999. godine, ključni odlučioci u spoljnoj politici SAD predviđali su kratko trajanje predstojeće operacije. Očekivali su (pogrešno) da će predsednik SRJ Slobodan Milošević pristati na sve njihove uslove rešavanja krize na Kosovu i Metohiji samo nekoliko dana, do maksimum nekoliko nedelja, nakon prvih vazdušnih napada. Ovaj tekst tvrdi da su pomenute pretpostavke bile bazirane na upotrebi analogija od strane odlučilaca u spoljnoj politici SAD, posebno na analogiji sa operacijom Deliberate Force u Bosni i Hercegovini 1995. godine. Tekst dodatno naglašava razlike između pomenutih situacija zbog kojih je analogija netačna, a koje su bile nedovoljno razmatrane od strane američkih odlučilaca.

In March 1999, when the decision to start the air-attacks on FR Yugoslavia was made, the most relevant foreign policy decision-makers in United States were predicting short duration of the operation. They have (wrongly) expected that FRY president Milosevic would accept their conditions and solutions for Kosovo – Metohija crisis just several days, to maximum several weeks, after the first air-attacks. This paper argues that the mentioned presumption was based on the analogical reasoning of the US foreign policy decision makers, particularly the analogy with the operation Deliberate force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. The paper additionally emphasizes the differences between the two situations, which were insufficiently considered by the US decision makers