Ničeova kritika morala

Abstract

Problem porekla dobra i zla još od rane mladosti bio je predmet Ničeovog interesovanja. Za razliku od onih koji moralne norme prihvataju kao date i univerzalne, koji veruju u večne natčulne vrednosti, Niče se nije ustručavao da moral podvrgne bespoštednoj kritici. On ističe da ne postoji moral kao takav, već različiti morali, koji su se uspostavljali tokom istorije shodno potrebama određenih zajednica da se održe i napreduju. Кada kritikuje moral kao protivprirodan, kao nihilistički, Niče u vidu ima tradicionalni evropski moral, koji ima hrišćansko poreklo. Da bi diskreditovao taj moral „stada“, on ga s jedne strane poredi sa aristokratskim antičkim moralom gospodara, a s druge strane genealoškim metodom pokušava da pokaže njegovo nisko, nemoralno poreklo. Niče razlikuje tri perioda čovečanstva: predmoralni, moralni i imoralni. Dok je u predmoralnom periodu naglasak bio na posledicama nekog postupka, u moralnom periodu poreklo postupka izvodi se iz namere moralnog subjekta. Niče očekuje da će se samoprevazilaženjem moral transformisati u imoralizam, poziciju s onu stranu dobra i zla. Iako se slaže sa Ničeom da moralno stanovište nije najviše, da ono podrazumeva potiskivanje nagonske energije, autor za razliku od nemačkog mislioca, koji se opredeljuje za imoralističko slavljenja života i nesputano ispoljavanje volje za moć, alternativu vidi u duhovnom preobražaju te energije. Razlog što Niče hrišćanstvo i hrišćanski moral doživljava kao proizvod ljudi slabe volje, slabog ja, autor vidi s jedne strane u Ničeovom naglašenom egocentrizmu, a s druge strane u tome što nije imao iskustvo susreta sa istinskim hrišćanstvom. Da je upoznao svetitelje, shvatio bi da natprirodno nije puka iluzija, da je duhovna sfera zaista iznad prirodne.

Problem of the origin of good and evil had been the subject of Nietzsche’s interest since his early youth. Unlike those who accept moral norms as given and universal, who believe in eternal, supersensible, Nietzsche did not hesitate to submit the morality to a merciless criticism. He emphasizes that the morality does not exist as such, but that there are different moralities that were established throughout history, according to the needs of certain communities to sustain and thrive. When criticizing morality as unnatural, as nihilistic, Nietzsche has in mind the traditional European morality that has the Christian origin. In order to discredit the “herd” morality, on the one hand, he compares it with an aristocratic ancient morality of the master, and, on the other hand, by using a genealogical method, he tries to present its low, immoral origin. Nietzsche distinguishes between three stages of humanity: pre-moral, moral, and immoral. In the pre-moral period, the emphasis was placed on the consequences of a certain action, whereas in the moral period, the origin of an action is derived from the intention of the moral subject. Nietzsche expects that by self-overcoming, the morality will transform itself to immoralism, a position beyond good and evil. The author agrees with Nietzsche in that the moral standpoint is not the highest one, that it implies repressing the instinctual energy. However, unlike the German thinker, who chooses immoralistic celebration of life and unrestrained manifestation of will to power, the author sees the alternative in the spiritual transformation of that energy. Why does Nietzsche experience Christianity and Christian morality as a product of persons of a weak will, a weak self? The author sees the reason, on the one hand, in Nietzsche’s enhanced egocentricity, and, on the other hand, in that he lacked the experience of meeting the true Christianity. Had he met the sacred persons, he would have understood that the supernatural is not a mere illusion, that the spiritual realm is, indeed, above the natural.