TY  - CHAP
AU  - Radić-Milosavljević, Ivana
AU  - Nedeljković, Stevan
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1050
AB  - The liberal international order today faces a crisis of legitimacy and social purpose. Although the crisis is primarily internal, the consequences have vast external manifestations, especially in Europe. Not only have US-EU relations been affected, but the effects of Europeanization have also changed, both within and outside the EU. Transformative power, once the main integrative resource of the European Union, no longer yields results. This is particularly evident in the Western Balkans. There are many reasons for the EU’s failure to play the essential transformative role in the Western Balkans region. Most authors ascribe this either to the Western Balkans’ domestic situation (Börzel, 2011; Freyburg and Richter, 2010; Ademović, 2019), or to the EU’s inability to enlarge further (‘integration incapacity’) and to exert a credible pressure (Kovačević, 2019), or to both reasons simultaneously (Bieber, 2019; Radić Milosavljević, 2019). This chapter puts this issue into a larger perspective and draws attention to the global context in which the EU’s enlargement policy and external Europeanization efforts operate. We argue that the crisis of the liberal order spilled over into the European Union and thus damaged the ability of the EU to shape institutions, processes and political outcomes in the Western Balkans. We observe these significant trends through the erosion of the value-institutional pillar of the liberal order and the EU’s increasing reliance on real-political instruments for pursuing its strategic goals. This chapter is organized as follows. First, we explain what a liberal international order is, the role and position of the European Community/Union in this order, and why a crisis occurs. Secondly, we explain how the crisis of the liberal order has affected the European Union and its ability to Europeanize itself and others. Finally, we give a brief genesis of the EU’s efforts to shape institutions, processes, and political outcomes in the Western Balkans and explain why there has been a slowdown and stalemate in recent years.
PB  - Baden-Baden : Nomos
T2  - The Europeanization of Montenegro: A Western Balkan Country and its Neighbourhood in Europe and the Global World
T1  - The Crisis of the Liberal International Order and the Europeanization of the Western Balkans
EP  - 44
SP  - 23
DO  - 10.5771/9783748911081-23
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Radić-Milosavljević, Ivana and Nedeljković, Stevan",
year = "2022",
abstract = "The liberal international order today faces a crisis of legitimacy and social purpose. Although the crisis is primarily internal, the consequences have vast external manifestations, especially in Europe. Not only have US-EU relations been affected, but the effects of Europeanization have also changed, both within and outside the EU. Transformative power, once the main integrative resource of the European Union, no longer yields results. This is particularly evident in the Western Balkans. There are many reasons for the EU’s failure to play the essential transformative role in the Western Balkans region. Most authors ascribe this either to the Western Balkans’ domestic situation (Börzel, 2011; Freyburg and Richter, 2010; Ademović, 2019), or to the EU’s inability to enlarge further (‘integration incapacity’) and to exert a credible pressure (Kovačević, 2019), or to both reasons simultaneously (Bieber, 2019; Radić Milosavljević, 2019). This chapter puts this issue into a larger perspective and draws attention to the global context in which the EU’s enlargement policy and external Europeanization efforts operate. We argue that the crisis of the liberal order spilled over into the European Union and thus damaged the ability of the EU to shape institutions, processes and political outcomes in the Western Balkans. We observe these significant trends through the erosion of the value-institutional pillar of the liberal order and the EU’s increasing reliance on real-political instruments for pursuing its strategic goals. This chapter is organized as follows. First, we explain what a liberal international order is, the role and position of the European Community/Union in this order, and why a crisis occurs. Secondly, we explain how the crisis of the liberal order has affected the European Union and its ability to Europeanize itself and others. Finally, we give a brief genesis of the EU’s efforts to shape institutions, processes, and political outcomes in the Western Balkans and explain why there has been a slowdown and stalemate in recent years.",
publisher = "Baden-Baden : Nomos",
journal = "The Europeanization of Montenegro: A Western Balkan Country and its Neighbourhood in Europe and the Global World",
booktitle = "The Crisis of the Liberal International Order and the Europeanization of the Western Balkans",
pages = "44-23",
doi = "10.5771/9783748911081-23"
}

Radić-Milosavljević, I.,& Nedeljković, S.. (2022). The Crisis of the Liberal International Order and the Europeanization of the Western Balkans. in The Europeanization of Montenegro: A Western Balkan Country and its Neighbourhood in Europe and the Global World
Baden-Baden : Nomos., 23-44.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911081-23

Radić-Milosavljević I, Nedeljković S. The Crisis of the Liberal International Order and the Europeanization of the Western Balkans. in The Europeanization of Montenegro: A Western Balkan Country and its Neighbourhood in Europe and the Global World. 2022;:23-44.
doi:10.5771/9783748911081-23 .

Radić-Milosavljević, Ivana, Nedeljković, Stevan, "The Crisis of the Liberal International Order and the Europeanization of the Western Balkans" in The Europeanization of Montenegro: A Western Balkan Country and its Neighbourhood in Europe and the Global World (2022):23-44,
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911081-23 . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nedeljković, Stevan
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/524
AB  - It's been 64 years since the European Coal and Steel Community was created, or 58 years from the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. This process of economic and political integration is unprecedented in modern history and represents a major challenge for contemporary concepts of the EU management system. Ways of the policy management and the depth of integration inside EU have changed dramatically since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, while the Lisbon Treaty continued integration and maybe announced two opposite processes-deeper integration and the transfer of powers from member states to the EU level, and the overall crisis of EU, especially in light of the institutional and economic crisis. The main question that this paper addresses is whether the developments in recent years have consolidated EU or they have weakened it, or whether these events are part of the solution to the institutional crisis or its cause and if they weakened it, what level of management is formed in EU. The general assumption is that the main indicators of the overall institutional crisis in the EU are: 1. Difficulties in reaching a consensus on the issues of EU development and strengthening of the role of large Member States, 2. Poor representational capacity of the Commission, and 3. The loss of legitimacy in the functioning of the Union. The main way in which this analysis is conducted is a collision of two opposite concepts of policy management in EU, which are seen as a structural causes of the crisis in EU: country-centric policy management, which relies on a theory of liberal institutionalism and the Community method, and then we analyze the main settings of both theories by observing processes in the conduct of policies at various levels in EU. European integration was firstly built on the premise that member states will voluntarily deepen their relationships beyond the initial trade relations in order to establish a common political and social goals, and the integration process has proved to be a good recipe for survival of larger and smaller countries in EU. The Lisbon Treaty placed member states at the heart of European integration primarily through their role in the Council of Ministers, and their national parliaments were given special rights with regard to monitoring the principle of subsidiarity. The influence of member states is evident the most in the European Council, as the leading institution of EU, and the Council of Ministers, and the most important difference in the functioning of the EU member states and their behavior lies in the acronym QMV or a Qualified Majority Voting institute, which sets diplomacy and executive power in a completely new context. With the expansion of EU to 28 member states, the rules have changed, creating new coalitions, a new weight and balance of power and the creation of national interests. New members do not have much experience like the old EU member states, and many of them disagree with supranational tradition in EU. Many do not feel quite at ease because of the structure of power in EU and existing coalitions. The old coalitions are changing and some traditional such as Berlin-Paris axis are slowly dying. We have demonstrated the structural causes of the institutional crisis in EU through the two opposing concepts of the EU system management, the intergovernmental method of governance and supranational management methods. The third management method that has been more and more evident since the mid-nineties of the 20th century, is a system of multilevel governance, that combines the previous two. Such a hybrid control mode hides structural causes of the institutional crisis in EU because the differences between the two main methods of management of the EU system are gradually turning them into contradiction. When we talk about low-representational capacity, we can see that this is a consequence of the predominant role of the member states and a conferred jurisdiction. On the one hand, the national governments are monitoring the executive powers of the Commission, and on the other side after the establishment of a comitology procedure, the Council and the national governments have become part of the whole process. It seems that through this procedure, member states have full control over the Commission, but for them it is much harder to control it in areas where the Commission has exclusive power, for example in the area of competition, state aid, agriculture, trade policy and the internal market. At first glance, it appears that COREPER, yet another modern institution, serves as a meeting of diplomats of the EU member states and which prepares meetings of the Council. However, a deeper analysis of the role of COREPER suggests that it is evident that it is the main decision-making body in EU, which is used for communication with the EU member states. In this sense, the COREPER has evolved from a simple intergovernmental body, informal in its nature, to a de facto decision-maker. Although the original role of COREPER was to prepare the meetings of the Council, the development of these institutions is one of the unrecorded cases of the evolution of institutions in EU. In other words, much of the power, and undefined powers have been transferred into the hands of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States. When we talk about democratic legitimacy in the functioning of the EU, we must bear in mind that this legitimacy has not received specific place in the constitutional structure of the EU. Far greater importance is given to the principle of the rule of law, and a double-line of democratic legitimacy tells us that the EU is not based so much on the role of citizens of the Union, from which it should derive its legitimacy, but that it is based on the treaties between its member states. This dual line is expressed at the institutional level in elections for the European Parliament, which are the only way of voting for policy makers at the EU level. This second line of democratic legitimacy is far more significant, and elections for the European Parliament are second-rate. The only power the Parliament reflects in the influence in EU, is the composition of the Commission. We must also say that the democratic principle in the Lisbon Treaty replaced the principle of democracy, and instead it was replaced by the primacy of them the transparency, representativeness, public debate and flexibility. The executive power has been predominant in EU since its creation, which produced huge consequences at a European level especially with regard to the management and the legitimacy of the institutions of the EU, but also at the national level because of the large transfer of competences to EU. In addition, we must add the conceptual diversity or heterogenity of European political demos because it is not one nation, but nations, and thus the logical question of how EU can submit diversity in light of the current institutional crisis. The legitimacy of EU is measured primarily through benefits of integration, represented by the concept of output rather than input-and, what is at the root of the entire crisis, is the fact that EU citizens simply do not base their relationship with the EU institutions on previous confidence but the expected benefits instead. This leads directly to the EU civil clientelism, rather than democracy, a concept that will only temporarily, or situationally determine the functioning of EU, because it is not a permanent solution.
AB  - Prošle su 64 godine od kada je stvorena Evropska zajednica za ugalj i čelik, odnosno 58 godina od stvaranja Evropske ekonomske zajednice i Evropske zajednice za atomsku energiju. Ovaj proces ekonomske i političke integracije je bez presedana u modernoj istoriji i predstavlja veliki izazov za savremene koncepte upravljanja sistemom EU. Načini vođenja politika i dubina integracije u EU su se dramatično promenili još od usvajanja Ugovora iz Mastrihta, dok je Lisabonski ugovor nastavio procese integracije i možda najavio dva suprotna procesa-dublju integraciju i prenošenje nadležnosti sa država članica na nivo EU, i sveukupnu krizu EU, naročito u svetlu institucionalne i ekonomske krize. Glavno pitanje kojim se rad bavi je da li su dešavanja proteklih godina konsolidovala EU ili su je oslabila, odnosno da li su ta dešavanja deo rešenja postojeće institucionalne krize ili su njen uzrok i ako su je oslabila, kakav nivo upravljanja se formira u EU. Opšta pretpostavka je da su glavni pokazatelji sveukupne institucionalne krize u EU oličeni u: 1. Teškoćama prilikom postizanja konsenzusa o najvažnijim pitanjima razvoja EU i jačanju uloge velikih država članica, 2. Slabom predstavljačkom kapacitetu Komisije, i 3. Gubitku legitimiteta u funkcionisanju Unije. Osnovni način na koji će se ova analiza sprovesti je sudaranje dva suprotstavljena koncepta upravljanja politikama u EU, koji su prepoznati kao strukturni uzroci krize u EU-državo-centričkog načina upravljanja politikama, koji se oslanja na teoriju liberalnog institucionalizma i metoda Zajednice, a zatim ćemo analizirati glavne postavke obe teorije posmatrajući procese u vođenju politika na različitim nivoima u EU.
PB  - Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
T2  - Kultura polisa
T1  - Institutional crisis of the European Union as an international organization
T1  - Institucionalna kriza Evropske unije kao međunarodne organizacije
EP  - 65
IS  - 28
SP  - 41
VL  - 12
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_524
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Nedeljković, Stevan",
year = "2015",
abstract = "It's been 64 years since the European Coal and Steel Community was created, or 58 years from the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. This process of economic and political integration is unprecedented in modern history and represents a major challenge for contemporary concepts of the EU management system. Ways of the policy management and the depth of integration inside EU have changed dramatically since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, while the Lisbon Treaty continued integration and maybe announced two opposite processes-deeper integration and the transfer of powers from member states to the EU level, and the overall crisis of EU, especially in light of the institutional and economic crisis. The main question that this paper addresses is whether the developments in recent years have consolidated EU or they have weakened it, or whether these events are part of the solution to the institutional crisis or its cause and if they weakened it, what level of management is formed in EU. The general assumption is that the main indicators of the overall institutional crisis in the EU are: 1. Difficulties in reaching a consensus on the issues of EU development and strengthening of the role of large Member States, 2. Poor representational capacity of the Commission, and 3. The loss of legitimacy in the functioning of the Union. The main way in which this analysis is conducted is a collision of two opposite concepts of policy management in EU, which are seen as a structural causes of the crisis in EU: country-centric policy management, which relies on a theory of liberal institutionalism and the Community method, and then we analyze the main settings of both theories by observing processes in the conduct of policies at various levels in EU. European integration was firstly built on the premise that member states will voluntarily deepen their relationships beyond the initial trade relations in order to establish a common political and social goals, and the integration process has proved to be a good recipe for survival of larger and smaller countries in EU. The Lisbon Treaty placed member states at the heart of European integration primarily through their role in the Council of Ministers, and their national parliaments were given special rights with regard to monitoring the principle of subsidiarity. The influence of member states is evident the most in the European Council, as the leading institution of EU, and the Council of Ministers, and the most important difference in the functioning of the EU member states and their behavior lies in the acronym QMV or a Qualified Majority Voting institute, which sets diplomacy and executive power in a completely new context. With the expansion of EU to 28 member states, the rules have changed, creating new coalitions, a new weight and balance of power and the creation of national interests. New members do not have much experience like the old EU member states, and many of them disagree with supranational tradition in EU. Many do not feel quite at ease because of the structure of power in EU and existing coalitions. The old coalitions are changing and some traditional such as Berlin-Paris axis are slowly dying. We have demonstrated the structural causes of the institutional crisis in EU through the two opposing concepts of the EU system management, the intergovernmental method of governance and supranational management methods. The third management method that has been more and more evident since the mid-nineties of the 20th century, is a system of multilevel governance, that combines the previous two. Such a hybrid control mode hides structural causes of the institutional crisis in EU because the differences between the two main methods of management of the EU system are gradually turning them into contradiction. When we talk about low-representational capacity, we can see that this is a consequence of the predominant role of the member states and a conferred jurisdiction. On the one hand, the national governments are monitoring the executive powers of the Commission, and on the other side after the establishment of a comitology procedure, the Council and the national governments have become part of the whole process. It seems that through this procedure, member states have full control over the Commission, but for them it is much harder to control it in areas where the Commission has exclusive power, for example in the area of competition, state aid, agriculture, trade policy and the internal market. At first glance, it appears that COREPER, yet another modern institution, serves as a meeting of diplomats of the EU member states and which prepares meetings of the Council. However, a deeper analysis of the role of COREPER suggests that it is evident that it is the main decision-making body in EU, which is used for communication with the EU member states. In this sense, the COREPER has evolved from a simple intergovernmental body, informal in its nature, to a de facto decision-maker. Although the original role of COREPER was to prepare the meetings of the Council, the development of these institutions is one of the unrecorded cases of the evolution of institutions in EU. In other words, much of the power, and undefined powers have been transferred into the hands of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States. When we talk about democratic legitimacy in the functioning of the EU, we must bear in mind that this legitimacy has not received specific place in the constitutional structure of the EU. Far greater importance is given to the principle of the rule of law, and a double-line of democratic legitimacy tells us that the EU is not based so much on the role of citizens of the Union, from which it should derive its legitimacy, but that it is based on the treaties between its member states. This dual line is expressed at the institutional level in elections for the European Parliament, which are the only way of voting for policy makers at the EU level. This second line of democratic legitimacy is far more significant, and elections for the European Parliament are second-rate. The only power the Parliament reflects in the influence in EU, is the composition of the Commission. We must also say that the democratic principle in the Lisbon Treaty replaced the principle of democracy, and instead it was replaced by the primacy of them the transparency, representativeness, public debate and flexibility. The executive power has been predominant in EU since its creation, which produced huge consequences at a European level especially with regard to the management and the legitimacy of the institutions of the EU, but also at the national level because of the large transfer of competences to EU. In addition, we must add the conceptual diversity or heterogenity of European political demos because it is not one nation, but nations, and thus the logical question of how EU can submit diversity in light of the current institutional crisis. The legitimacy of EU is measured primarily through benefits of integration, represented by the concept of output rather than input-and, what is at the root of the entire crisis, is the fact that EU citizens simply do not base their relationship with the EU institutions on previous confidence but the expected benefits instead. This leads directly to the EU civil clientelism, rather than democracy, a concept that will only temporarily, or situationally determine the functioning of EU, because it is not a permanent solution., Prošle su 64 godine od kada je stvorena Evropska zajednica za ugalj i čelik, odnosno 58 godina od stvaranja Evropske ekonomske zajednice i Evropske zajednice za atomsku energiju. Ovaj proces ekonomske i političke integracije je bez presedana u modernoj istoriji i predstavlja veliki izazov za savremene koncepte upravljanja sistemom EU. Načini vođenja politika i dubina integracije u EU su se dramatično promenili još od usvajanja Ugovora iz Mastrihta, dok je Lisabonski ugovor nastavio procese integracije i možda najavio dva suprotna procesa-dublju integraciju i prenošenje nadležnosti sa država članica na nivo EU, i sveukupnu krizu EU, naročito u svetlu institucionalne i ekonomske krize. Glavno pitanje kojim se rad bavi je da li su dešavanja proteklih godina konsolidovala EU ili su je oslabila, odnosno da li su ta dešavanja deo rešenja postojeće institucionalne krize ili su njen uzrok i ako su je oslabila, kakav nivo upravljanja se formira u EU. Opšta pretpostavka je da su glavni pokazatelji sveukupne institucionalne krize u EU oličeni u: 1. Teškoćama prilikom postizanja konsenzusa o najvažnijim pitanjima razvoja EU i jačanju uloge velikih država članica, 2. Slabom predstavljačkom kapacitetu Komisije, i 3. Gubitku legitimiteta u funkcionisanju Unije. Osnovni način na koji će se ova analiza sprovesti je sudaranje dva suprotstavljena koncepta upravljanja politikama u EU, koji su prepoznati kao strukturni uzroci krize u EU-državo-centričkog načina upravljanja politikama, koji se oslanja na teoriju liberalnog institucionalizma i metoda Zajednice, a zatim ćemo analizirati glavne postavke obe teorije posmatrajući procese u vođenju politika na različitim nivoima u EU.",
publisher = "Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd",
journal = "Kultura polisa",
title = "Institutional crisis of the European Union as an international organization, Institucionalna kriza Evropske unije kao međunarodne organizacije",
pages = "65-41",
number = "28",
volume = "12",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_524"
}

Nedeljković, S.. (2015). Institutional crisis of the European Union as an international organization. in Kultura polisa
Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd., 12(28), 41-65.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_524

Nedeljković S. Institutional crisis of the European Union as an international organization. in Kultura polisa. 2015;12(28):41-65.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_524 .

Nedeljković, Stevan, "Institutional crisis of the European Union as an international organization" in Kultura polisa, 12, no. 28 (2015):41-65,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_524 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dašić, Marko
AU  - Nedeljković, Stevan
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/500
AB  - The main strategic goal and foreign policy priority of Republic of Serbia, from 2000 onwards, is membership of the European Union. Striving to achieve the set objective was strongly supported by majority of Serbian citizens. However, Serbia has never encouraged broad internal discussion about potential advantages and/or disadvantages of thus established state policy. Even a attempt to check costs and benefits of membership of EU is sharply proclaimed as a regress of Serbia to nineties, chaos and hopelessness. 'Non-alternatives' policy of European path is as a rule accompanied by the lack of expert analysis on validity of EU alternatives. We find, in above written facts, scientific and social justification also of undertaking research on, primarily, the existence of alternative for 'Europe', and then their feasibility in Serbian context. The authors of this paper presents the results of the economic analysis of strategic shift of Serbia towards two mutually overlapping directions of external economic relations: a) Increased economic cooperation and foreign direct investment from BRICS countries; b) Serbia's accession to the European Economic Area. The paper examines two focal questions: Is it shifting to BRICS countries a valid alternative to European path of Serbia? Second, whether Serbian prospective membership of European Economic Area provides economic benefits, similar to those in political and economic membership in EU. Intellectual ignorance of the BRICS and the need of explanation of this multilateral diplomatic process, imposes answers on two corrective questions: what is BRICS actually and what are the areas of their cooperation. The genesis and the current state of the European Economic Area will also be explained in order to obtain better understanding of the Serbian position towards that institutional arrangement. Finally, the main goal of the research is to check is it justified for Serbia to give up its European path, bearing in mind offered and analyzed alternatives.
AB  - Članstvo Republike Srbije u Evropskoj uniji je strateški cilj i spoljnopolitički prioritet svih vlada Republike Srbije od 2000. godine do danas. Težnja ka ostvarivanju postavljenog cilja potpomognuta je i voljom građana koji su od samog početka procesa, nadplovičnom većinom, podržavali pridruživanje Srbije evropskoj porodici naroda. Međutim, država Srbija nikada nije podsticala široku debatu o prednostima i potencijalnim nedostacima članstva Srbije u Evropskoj uniji. Ono je utemeljeno kao neupitno, a svaki pokušaj provere odnosa troškova i koristi (cost/benefit) članstva proglašavan je pokušajem vraćanja Srbije u devedesete, haos i beznađe. Politika 'bezalterantivnosti' evropskog puta propraćena je i nedostatkom stručnih analiza o valjanosti alternativa Evropskoj uniji. U navedenim činjenicama pronalazimo naučnu, ali i društvenu opravdanost preduzimanju istraživanja o, pre svega, postojanju alternativa 'Evropi', a zatim i njihovoj ostvarivosti. Autori u ovom radu prikazuju rezultate ekonomske analize strateškog okretanja Srbije ka dva, međusobno neisključujuća smera spoljnih ekonomskih odnosa: a) pojačana ekonomska saradnja i podsticanje stranih direktnih investicija iz država BRICS-a; b) pristupanje Srbije Evropskom ekonomskom prostoru (European Economic Area). Nastojaće da u radu odgovore na dva središna pitanja: da li je okretanje državama BRICS-a (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) valjana alternativa evropskom putu Srbije? Drugo, da li bi pripadnost Srbije Evropskom ekonomskom prostoru omogućila ekonomske koristi nalik onim u političko-ekonomskom članstvu u Evropskoj uniji? Nepoznavanje BRICS-a i potreba objašnjenja prirode ove multilateralne platforme za dijalog i saradnju, nameće ponudu odgovora na korektivna pitanja šta, zapravo BRICS jeste i koje su oblasti saradnje država učesnica. Geneza i sadašnje stanje Evropskog ekonomskog prostora biće takođe objašnjeni u službi boljeg razumevanja pozicije Srbije prema ovom institucionalnom aranžmanu evropskih država. Osnovni cilj rada je analitička provera ekonomske (ne)opravdanosti odustajanja Srbije od evropskog puta, uz naročit osvrt na postojeći nivo ekonomskih aktivnosti zemalja BRICS-a na srpskom tržištu i Srbije na tržištu Evropskog ekonomskog prostora.
PB  - Univerzitet u Prištini - Ekonomski fakultet, Kosovska Mitrovica
T2  - Ekonomski pogledi
T1  - Alternative Serbian association to the European Union: The view to two possible way
T1  - Alternative pridruživanju Srbije Evropskoj uniji - pogled ka dva moguća puta
EP  - 75
IS  - 3
SP  - 57
VL  - 17
DO  - 10.5937/EkoPog1503057D
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Dašić, Marko and Nedeljković, Stevan",
year = "2015",
abstract = "The main strategic goal and foreign policy priority of Republic of Serbia, from 2000 onwards, is membership of the European Union. Striving to achieve the set objective was strongly supported by majority of Serbian citizens. However, Serbia has never encouraged broad internal discussion about potential advantages and/or disadvantages of thus established state policy. Even a attempt to check costs and benefits of membership of EU is sharply proclaimed as a regress of Serbia to nineties, chaos and hopelessness. 'Non-alternatives' policy of European path is as a rule accompanied by the lack of expert analysis on validity of EU alternatives. We find, in above written facts, scientific and social justification also of undertaking research on, primarily, the existence of alternative for 'Europe', and then their feasibility in Serbian context. The authors of this paper presents the results of the economic analysis of strategic shift of Serbia towards two mutually overlapping directions of external economic relations: a) Increased economic cooperation and foreign direct investment from BRICS countries; b) Serbia's accession to the European Economic Area. The paper examines two focal questions: Is it shifting to BRICS countries a valid alternative to European path of Serbia? Second, whether Serbian prospective membership of European Economic Area provides economic benefits, similar to those in political and economic membership in EU. Intellectual ignorance of the BRICS and the need of explanation of this multilateral diplomatic process, imposes answers on two corrective questions: what is BRICS actually and what are the areas of their cooperation. The genesis and the current state of the European Economic Area will also be explained in order to obtain better understanding of the Serbian position towards that institutional arrangement. Finally, the main goal of the research is to check is it justified for Serbia to give up its European path, bearing in mind offered and analyzed alternatives., Članstvo Republike Srbije u Evropskoj uniji je strateški cilj i spoljnopolitički prioritet svih vlada Republike Srbije od 2000. godine do danas. Težnja ka ostvarivanju postavljenog cilja potpomognuta je i voljom građana koji su od samog početka procesa, nadplovičnom većinom, podržavali pridruživanje Srbije evropskoj porodici naroda. Međutim, država Srbija nikada nije podsticala široku debatu o prednostima i potencijalnim nedostacima članstva Srbije u Evropskoj uniji. Ono je utemeljeno kao neupitno, a svaki pokušaj provere odnosa troškova i koristi (cost/benefit) članstva proglašavan je pokušajem vraćanja Srbije u devedesete, haos i beznađe. Politika 'bezalterantivnosti' evropskog puta propraćena je i nedostatkom stručnih analiza o valjanosti alternativa Evropskoj uniji. U navedenim činjenicama pronalazimo naučnu, ali i društvenu opravdanost preduzimanju istraživanja o, pre svega, postojanju alternativa 'Evropi', a zatim i njihovoj ostvarivosti. Autori u ovom radu prikazuju rezultate ekonomske analize strateškog okretanja Srbije ka dva, međusobno neisključujuća smera spoljnih ekonomskih odnosa: a) pojačana ekonomska saradnja i podsticanje stranih direktnih investicija iz država BRICS-a; b) pristupanje Srbije Evropskom ekonomskom prostoru (European Economic Area). Nastojaće da u radu odgovore na dva središna pitanja: da li je okretanje državama BRICS-a (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) valjana alternativa evropskom putu Srbije? Drugo, da li bi pripadnost Srbije Evropskom ekonomskom prostoru omogućila ekonomske koristi nalik onim u političko-ekonomskom članstvu u Evropskoj uniji? Nepoznavanje BRICS-a i potreba objašnjenja prirode ove multilateralne platforme za dijalog i saradnju, nameće ponudu odgovora na korektivna pitanja šta, zapravo BRICS jeste i koje su oblasti saradnje država učesnica. Geneza i sadašnje stanje Evropskog ekonomskog prostora biće takođe objašnjeni u službi boljeg razumevanja pozicije Srbije prema ovom institucionalnom aranžmanu evropskih država. Osnovni cilj rada je analitička provera ekonomske (ne)opravdanosti odustajanja Srbije od evropskog puta, uz naročit osvrt na postojeći nivo ekonomskih aktivnosti zemalja BRICS-a na srpskom tržištu i Srbije na tržištu Evropskog ekonomskog prostora.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Prištini - Ekonomski fakultet, Kosovska Mitrovica",
journal = "Ekonomski pogledi",
title = "Alternative Serbian association to the European Union: The view to two possible way, Alternative pridruživanju Srbije Evropskoj uniji - pogled ka dva moguća puta",
pages = "75-57",
number = "3",
volume = "17",
doi = "10.5937/EkoPog1503057D"
}

Dašić, M.,& Nedeljković, S.. (2015). Alternative Serbian association to the European Union: The view to two possible way. in Ekonomski pogledi
Univerzitet u Prištini - Ekonomski fakultet, Kosovska Mitrovica., 17(3), 57-75.
https://doi.org/10.5937/EkoPog1503057D

Dašić M, Nedeljković S. Alternative Serbian association to the European Union: The view to two possible way. in Ekonomski pogledi. 2015;17(3):57-75.
doi:10.5937/EkoPog1503057D .

Dašić, Marko, Nedeljković, Stevan, "Alternative Serbian association to the European Union: The view to two possible way" in Ekonomski pogledi, 17, no. 3 (2015):57-75,
https://doi.org/10.5937/EkoPog1503057D . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nedeljković, Stevan
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/480
AB  - After wars in which it was included, the Western Balkans region entered the new phase of development after the whole decade of instability. The path towards the recovery of the national and social systems promised a lot, but after anew instability with the murder of the Prime minister of Serbia, and constant political frictions, the region was again in front of a difficult choice. This time, the choice is not between a war and a peace, but between a desire to become a part of the European Union, and a constant stumble in solving the problems that no region, that became a part of the Union, didn't face. The gola of this work is to analyse technical and political aspects of those processes, so we get closer to the answer why it is so. We are speaking of a process where there are answers to the questions of a cause of consequences, that we can feel even today, as well as to the questions about the European future of the region, shich should have already happened. We are speaking of the process of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration. The Brussels agreement deals with a number of disputed issues between Belgrade and Prishtina, especially the status of the four municipalities in northern Kosovo inhabited by about 40,000 Serbs which have remained outside Prishtina's control. A compromise was reached over many of the contentious issues including police, education, urban planning, economics, culture, and the health and community organisations of the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo. However, the agreement has been interpreted differently by both sides. The authorities in Kosovo claim that it represents Serbia's recognition of Kosovo as a de facto state, whereas the Serbian side maintains that the agreement will ensure the autonomy of the Serbian municipalities, and that establishing good relations with Kosovo does not amount to a recognition of its independence. However, these agreements do not guarantee Kosovo's international recognition or its membership in the United Nations and other international organisations. Nor do they give autonomy to the Serbian communities; the community of Serbian municipalities will only have executive and coordinative powers. The normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a prerequisite by the EU for continuing the process of the European integration of the two states. After signing the agreement on 22 April, the European Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia, and of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. In this case the German position will be decisive. Although the German government received the signature of the document with satisfaction, Berlin also made it clear that it expects the agreement's provisions to be implemented effectively. The Agreement primarily concerns the status of the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, and provides for their voluntary association. This will therefore include both four municipalities in northern Kosovo and the municipalities inhabited mostly by Serbs in the country's interior. This solution only partially meets the expectations of Belgrade, which seeks to strengthen the Serbian minority institutionally and politically, especially in the four northern municipalities. The community authorities will coordinate the municipalities' activities within their executive powers in the fields of urban planning, education, culture and health. The community is to represent the municipalities in their relations with Prishtina, but it will not have its own competences, apart from any which may be delegated by the central government. In this way, the Serbian local community's competences will not generally go beyond those of Kosovo's other municipalities, although it will provide a platform for the leaders of the Serbian community to represent its interests. The mayors of the four Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo will be able to submit a list of candidates from which Kosovo's interior minister will select the local police commander in northern Kosovo. The matter of who takes up this position will therefore depend on agreement between the authorities in Prishtina and the leaders of the four Serbian municipalities. The Serbian police structures already existing in the north will be incorporated into the Kosovo police. The police forces are to be fully funded from the Kosovo state budget; the agreement does not specify whether the Serbian institutions in Kosovo will continue to be funded by Belgrade, which may prove to be an area of future conflict. In matters relating to the judiciary in Kosovo, the Serbian municipalities will be responsible for a specific department appellate court in Prishtina, composed of judges representing the Kosovo Serbs. In addition, Serbia's Prime Minister at that time, Ivica Dacic has stated that he has received assurances from NATO, that the Kosovo army would not enter the Serb-inhabited municipalities in the north of Kosovo. Serbia's recognition of Kosovo is the most important demand of the Prishtina authorities. The agreement makes only limited reference to relations between Kosovo and Serbia; the penultimate paragraph of the document requires the parties to refrain from mutually impeding their progress in integrating with the European Union. During the negotiations, the Serbian side requested similar wording relating to the UN and the OSCE to be removed. The Serbian government unanimously adopted the document, but it has avoided taking any actions which would demonstrate that it has recognized Kosovo as a state. It does not mean that the agreement is subject to a process of ratification, which would be appropriate for agreements between states. Thus, the nature of the agreement is open to an asymmetric interpretation. It is unlikely that Kosovo and Serbia will agree on its true nature any time in the near future. The agreement is an important step in the direction of establishing good neighborly relations between the Serbian and the Albanian people, although it does not determine the ultimate success of the dialogue. To improve relations between them and their prospects for being integrated into the EU, the smooth implementation of the agreement will be essential. The biggest challenge to it is the skepticism of the Serbs living in northern Kosovo and of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The question of how to implement the agreement remains open. It provides for the creation of a special Kosovar/Serbian committee to deal with its implementation. Not specified in the document, however, is who would be able to join the committee, or what competences such persons will be granted. The agreement removes a major barrier to the integration of Serbia and Kosovo with the EU, but it does not conclusively establish any specific date to start Serbia's accession negotiations or Kosovo's association talks. The European Commission and the European Parliament clearly recommend these actions; and many European leaders have also expressed similar sentiments. A much more muted reaction, however, has come from Berlin; the German government has stated that the agreements are only the first step towards an expected 'normalisation' of relations. Germany may demand rigorous implementation of the agreement before the date for starting accession talks is fixed (i.e. at the Council meeting in June), perhaps by imposing conditional clauses for its approval. Serbia has made far-reaching concessions, but its path towards EU depends on at least a partial and visible implementation of the agreement in the near future. The question is: Is this the end of the Serbian policy towards Kosovo or does it constitute a new policy direction?.
AB  - Nakon ratova u koje je bio uklјučen, region Zapadnog Balkana je posle čitave decenije nestabilnosti, ušao u novu fazu razvoja. Put ka ozdravlјenju državnog i društvenog sistema je obećavao mnogo, ali nakon ponovne nestabilnosti ubistvom premijera Srbije, i konstantnih političkih trzavica, region se opet našao pred teškim izborom. Ovog puta izbor nije između rata ili mira, već između želјe da postane deo Evropske unije (EU), i stalnog spoticanja u rešavanju problema sa kojima se nijedan region, koji je postao deo Unije, nije suočio. Cilј rada je analiza tehničkih i političkih aspekata tih procesa, kako bismo bili bliži odgovoru zašto je to tako. Reč je o procesu u kome se nalaze odgovori na pitanja uzroka posledica koje i danas osećamo, ali i na pitanja o evropskoj budućnosti regiona, koja je po svim procenama već trebalo da se desi. Reč je o procesu normalizacije odnosa Srbije i Kosova u kontekstu evropskih integracija.
PB  - Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
T2  - Kultura polisa
T1  - Relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration
T1  - Odnosi Srbije i Kosova u kontekstu evropskih integracija
EP  - 46
IS  - 25
SP  - 29
VL  - 11
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_480
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Nedeljković, Stevan",
year = "2014",
abstract = "After wars in which it was included, the Western Balkans region entered the new phase of development after the whole decade of instability. The path towards the recovery of the national and social systems promised a lot, but after anew instability with the murder of the Prime minister of Serbia, and constant political frictions, the region was again in front of a difficult choice. This time, the choice is not between a war and a peace, but between a desire to become a part of the European Union, and a constant stumble in solving the problems that no region, that became a part of the Union, didn't face. The gola of this work is to analyse technical and political aspects of those processes, so we get closer to the answer why it is so. We are speaking of a process where there are answers to the questions of a cause of consequences, that we can feel even today, as well as to the questions about the European future of the region, shich should have already happened. We are speaking of the process of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration. The Brussels agreement deals with a number of disputed issues between Belgrade and Prishtina, especially the status of the four municipalities in northern Kosovo inhabited by about 40,000 Serbs which have remained outside Prishtina's control. A compromise was reached over many of the contentious issues including police, education, urban planning, economics, culture, and the health and community organisations of the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo. However, the agreement has been interpreted differently by both sides. The authorities in Kosovo claim that it represents Serbia's recognition of Kosovo as a de facto state, whereas the Serbian side maintains that the agreement will ensure the autonomy of the Serbian municipalities, and that establishing good relations with Kosovo does not amount to a recognition of its independence. However, these agreements do not guarantee Kosovo's international recognition or its membership in the United Nations and other international organisations. Nor do they give autonomy to the Serbian communities; the community of Serbian municipalities will only have executive and coordinative powers. The normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a prerequisite by the EU for continuing the process of the European integration of the two states. After signing the agreement on 22 April, the European Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia, and of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. In this case the German position will be decisive. Although the German government received the signature of the document with satisfaction, Berlin also made it clear that it expects the agreement's provisions to be implemented effectively. The Agreement primarily concerns the status of the Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, and provides for their voluntary association. This will therefore include both four municipalities in northern Kosovo and the municipalities inhabited mostly by Serbs in the country's interior. This solution only partially meets the expectations of Belgrade, which seeks to strengthen the Serbian minority institutionally and politically, especially in the four northern municipalities. The community authorities will coordinate the municipalities' activities within their executive powers in the fields of urban planning, education, culture and health. The community is to represent the municipalities in their relations with Prishtina, but it will not have its own competences, apart from any which may be delegated by the central government. In this way, the Serbian local community's competences will not generally go beyond those of Kosovo's other municipalities, although it will provide a platform for the leaders of the Serbian community to represent its interests. The mayors of the four Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo will be able to submit a list of candidates from which Kosovo's interior minister will select the local police commander in northern Kosovo. The matter of who takes up this position will therefore depend on agreement between the authorities in Prishtina and the leaders of the four Serbian municipalities. The Serbian police structures already existing in the north will be incorporated into the Kosovo police. The police forces are to be fully funded from the Kosovo state budget; the agreement does not specify whether the Serbian institutions in Kosovo will continue to be funded by Belgrade, which may prove to be an area of future conflict. In matters relating to the judiciary in Kosovo, the Serbian municipalities will be responsible for a specific department appellate court in Prishtina, composed of judges representing the Kosovo Serbs. In addition, Serbia's Prime Minister at that time, Ivica Dacic has stated that he has received assurances from NATO, that the Kosovo army would not enter the Serb-inhabited municipalities in the north of Kosovo. Serbia's recognition of Kosovo is the most important demand of the Prishtina authorities. The agreement makes only limited reference to relations between Kosovo and Serbia; the penultimate paragraph of the document requires the parties to refrain from mutually impeding their progress in integrating with the European Union. During the negotiations, the Serbian side requested similar wording relating to the UN and the OSCE to be removed. The Serbian government unanimously adopted the document, but it has avoided taking any actions which would demonstrate that it has recognized Kosovo as a state. It does not mean that the agreement is subject to a process of ratification, which would be appropriate for agreements between states. Thus, the nature of the agreement is open to an asymmetric interpretation. It is unlikely that Kosovo and Serbia will agree on its true nature any time in the near future. The agreement is an important step in the direction of establishing good neighborly relations between the Serbian and the Albanian people, although it does not determine the ultimate success of the dialogue. To improve relations between them and their prospects for being integrated into the EU, the smooth implementation of the agreement will be essential. The biggest challenge to it is the skepticism of the Serbs living in northern Kosovo and of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The question of how to implement the agreement remains open. It provides for the creation of a special Kosovar/Serbian committee to deal with its implementation. Not specified in the document, however, is who would be able to join the committee, or what competences such persons will be granted. The agreement removes a major barrier to the integration of Serbia and Kosovo with the EU, but it does not conclusively establish any specific date to start Serbia's accession negotiations or Kosovo's association talks. The European Commission and the European Parliament clearly recommend these actions; and many European leaders have also expressed similar sentiments. A much more muted reaction, however, has come from Berlin; the German government has stated that the agreements are only the first step towards an expected 'normalisation' of relations. Germany may demand rigorous implementation of the agreement before the date for starting accession talks is fixed (i.e. at the Council meeting in June), perhaps by imposing conditional clauses for its approval. Serbia has made far-reaching concessions, but its path towards EU depends on at least a partial and visible implementation of the agreement in the near future. The question is: Is this the end of the Serbian policy towards Kosovo or does it constitute a new policy direction?., Nakon ratova u koje je bio uklјučen, region Zapadnog Balkana je posle čitave decenije nestabilnosti, ušao u novu fazu razvoja. Put ka ozdravlјenju državnog i društvenog sistema je obećavao mnogo, ali nakon ponovne nestabilnosti ubistvom premijera Srbije, i konstantnih političkih trzavica, region se opet našao pred teškim izborom. Ovog puta izbor nije između rata ili mira, već između želјe da postane deo Evropske unije (EU), i stalnog spoticanja u rešavanju problema sa kojima se nijedan region, koji je postao deo Unije, nije suočio. Cilј rada je analiza tehničkih i političkih aspekata tih procesa, kako bismo bili bliži odgovoru zašto je to tako. Reč je o procesu u kome se nalaze odgovori na pitanja uzroka posledica koje i danas osećamo, ali i na pitanja o evropskoj budućnosti regiona, koja je po svim procenama već trebalo da se desi. Reč je o procesu normalizacije odnosa Srbije i Kosova u kontekstu evropskih integracija.",
publisher = "Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd",
journal = "Kultura polisa",
title = "Relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration, Odnosi Srbije i Kosova u kontekstu evropskih integracija",
pages = "46-29",
number = "25",
volume = "11",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_480"
}

Nedeljković, S.. (2014). Relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration. in Kultura polisa
Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd., 11(25), 29-46.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_480

Nedeljković S. Relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration. in Kultura polisa. 2014;11(25):29-46.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_480 .

Nedeljković, Stevan, "Relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the context of European integration" in Kultura polisa, 11, no. 25 (2014):29-46,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_480 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nedeljković, Stevan
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/476
AB  - This article is analysing the very core of the contemporary EU Russia relations. This essay highlights some fundamental principles which, combined together, are essential for the EU-Russia relations. The analysis goes from the structuralist approach in international relations, considering the two essential dimensions and outcomes of this approach-the possibility of socialization and the possibility of competition between the actors in international relations. The first dimension of EU Russia relations was present during the 90's, and the second has been present since Putin became the leader of Russia, that is since 1999. The EU was working closely with its partners in the West in socialization of Russia and bringing Russia to the rules of the Western civilization. It gave Russia about 2 billion dollars, demanding that Russia implement huge reforms. Russia was on its knees at that time. But, the rules then changed. Russia began to exploit its natural resources, especially gas and oil, and it became the first trade partner of EU. Now EU became dependent on Russia, and Russia used this chance very well. The value approach in their relations stopped being essential and at that moment we had a new dimension of those relations the interest dimension. In order to give the answer to our question, that is, whether the EU-Russia relations are pragmatic or strategic, we start our analysis in the second part of this work, by going through occasional clashes between EU and Russia. From 2000 to the present day, we have the strategic dimension of their relations and the main focus of this part of the analysis is on the disputes regarding energetics and the crisis in Ukraine. These two spheres of interest are essential because the member-states of EU have different approaches and opinions towards Russia Those countries that are closer to Russia, especially the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, don't want to see Russia as the main partner of EU, because of their difficult experience with the Soviet Union. And those countries that are dependent on the Russian gas, especially Germany, the Netherlands and France, do want Russia as their main partner and they don't want to impose some serious sanctions against it regarding the current crisis in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. This work is analysing the purpose of the present sanctions against Russia and their effect on mutual relations, especially in the light of the absence of unanimity in EU and its partners in the West.
AB  - Dva centra moći u nastajanju, koji će naposletku verovatno dovesti do pojave multipolarnog sistema-Evropska unija i Rusija, predstavljaju lakmus papir za sve promene u kontekstu evolucije međunarodnog sistema i rasporeda moći u njegovoj strukturi. Ono na šta posebno treba obratiti pažnju jeste karakter njihovih odnosa, odnosno pragmatično i strateško u njima. Kako bismo osvetlili sebi put, treba poći od dve dominantne debate prilikom ispitivanja tipa odnosa EU i Rusije, odnosno od rasprava vrednosnog i interesnog pristupa. Posebnu pažnju treba posvetiti primeni tvrdnji ovih škola na dva dominantna nivoa odnosa dve strane - na geostratešku borbu u Evropi i energetsku saradnju, kao i na borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala i terorizma. Poseban element ove slagalice predstavlja kriza u Ukrajini, kojoj se ne nazire kraj, a koja zapravo sačinjava 'sveto trojstvo' pomenutih oblasti odnosa EU i Rusije.
PB  - Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd
T2  - Kultura polisa
T1  - Relations between the European Union and Russia
T1  - Odnosi Evropske unije i Rusije - pragmatično ili strateško partnerstvo?
EP  - 246
IS  - 24
SP  - 229
VL  - 11
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_476
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Nedeljković, Stevan",
year = "2014",
abstract = "This article is analysing the very core of the contemporary EU Russia relations. This essay highlights some fundamental principles which, combined together, are essential for the EU-Russia relations. The analysis goes from the structuralist approach in international relations, considering the two essential dimensions and outcomes of this approach-the possibility of socialization and the possibility of competition between the actors in international relations. The first dimension of EU Russia relations was present during the 90's, and the second has been present since Putin became the leader of Russia, that is since 1999. The EU was working closely with its partners in the West in socialization of Russia and bringing Russia to the rules of the Western civilization. It gave Russia about 2 billion dollars, demanding that Russia implement huge reforms. Russia was on its knees at that time. But, the rules then changed. Russia began to exploit its natural resources, especially gas and oil, and it became the first trade partner of EU. Now EU became dependent on Russia, and Russia used this chance very well. The value approach in their relations stopped being essential and at that moment we had a new dimension of those relations the interest dimension. In order to give the answer to our question, that is, whether the EU-Russia relations are pragmatic or strategic, we start our analysis in the second part of this work, by going through occasional clashes between EU and Russia. From 2000 to the present day, we have the strategic dimension of their relations and the main focus of this part of the analysis is on the disputes regarding energetics and the crisis in Ukraine. These two spheres of interest are essential because the member-states of EU have different approaches and opinions towards Russia Those countries that are closer to Russia, especially the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, don't want to see Russia as the main partner of EU, because of their difficult experience with the Soviet Union. And those countries that are dependent on the Russian gas, especially Germany, the Netherlands and France, do want Russia as their main partner and they don't want to impose some serious sanctions against it regarding the current crisis in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. This work is analysing the purpose of the present sanctions against Russia and their effect on mutual relations, especially in the light of the absence of unanimity in EU and its partners in the West., Dva centra moći u nastajanju, koji će naposletku verovatno dovesti do pojave multipolarnog sistema-Evropska unija i Rusija, predstavljaju lakmus papir za sve promene u kontekstu evolucije međunarodnog sistema i rasporeda moći u njegovoj strukturi. Ono na šta posebno treba obratiti pažnju jeste karakter njihovih odnosa, odnosno pragmatično i strateško u njima. Kako bismo osvetlili sebi put, treba poći od dve dominantne debate prilikom ispitivanja tipa odnosa EU i Rusije, odnosno od rasprava vrednosnog i interesnog pristupa. Posebnu pažnju treba posvetiti primeni tvrdnji ovih škola na dva dominantna nivoa odnosa dve strane - na geostratešku borbu u Evropi i energetsku saradnju, kao i na borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala i terorizma. Poseban element ove slagalice predstavlja kriza u Ukrajini, kojoj se ne nazire kraj, a koja zapravo sačinjava 'sveto trojstvo' pomenutih oblasti odnosa EU i Rusije.",
publisher = "Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd",
journal = "Kultura polisa",
title = "Relations between the European Union and Russia, Odnosi Evropske unije i Rusije - pragmatično ili strateško partnerstvo?",
pages = "246-229",
number = "24",
volume = "11",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_476"
}

Nedeljković, S.. (2014). Relations between the European Union and Russia. in Kultura polisa
Kultura - Polis Novi Sad i Institut za evropske studije, Beograd., 11(24), 229-246.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_476

Nedeljković S. Relations between the European Union and Russia. in Kultura polisa. 2014;11(24):229-246.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_476 .

Nedeljković, Stevan, "Relations between the European Union and Russia" in Kultura polisa, 11, no. 24 (2014):229-246,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_476 .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nedeljković, Stevan
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rfpn.fpn.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/474
AB  - This text is analyzing the use of theoretical approaches to the process of Europeanization, especially the rational choice institutionalism and normative institutionalism, on example of Serbia. The whole process of Europeanization is set in the context of wider process of European integration of the Western Balkans region, and the text is reveiling the deepest interests, which guide the European Union and Serbia in this very process. This approach to the process of Europeanization shows the characteristics of the Serbian path towards EU, and a special attention is paid to the political conditionality, which the European Union is using against Serbia, as a country that wishes to join it. The text is especially dealing with the clarity and the speed of rewarding, as well as centrifugal forces of the process itself.
AB  - Tekst se bavi primenom teoretskih pristupa procesu evropeizacije, pre svega institucionalizma racionalnog izbora i noramtivnog institucionalizma, i to na primeru Srbije. Čitav proces evropeizacije postavljen je u kontekst šireg procesa evropskih integracija regiona Zapadnog Balkana, a tekst otkriva najdublje interese kojima se rukovode Evropska unija i Srbija u samom procesu. Ovakav pristup procesu evropeizacije odslikava karakteristike puta Srbije ka EU, a posebna pažnja je posvećena politici uslovljavanja, koju Evropska unija sprovodi prema Srbiji, kao državi koja želi da postane njen član. Tekst se naročito bavi jasnoćom uslova, brzinom nagrađivanja i centrifugalnim silama samog procesa.
PB  - Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
T2  - Međunarodna politika
T1  - Europeanization of Serbia
T1  - Evropeizacija Srbije
EP  - 112
IS  - 1153-1154
SP  - 90
VL  - 65
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_474
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Nedeljković, Stevan",
year = "2014",
abstract = "This text is analyzing the use of theoretical approaches to the process of Europeanization, especially the rational choice institutionalism and normative institutionalism, on example of Serbia. The whole process of Europeanization is set in the context of wider process of European integration of the Western Balkans region, and the text is reveiling the deepest interests, which guide the European Union and Serbia in this very process. This approach to the process of Europeanization shows the characteristics of the Serbian path towards EU, and a special attention is paid to the political conditionality, which the European Union is using against Serbia, as a country that wishes to join it. The text is especially dealing with the clarity and the speed of rewarding, as well as centrifugal forces of the process itself., Tekst se bavi primenom teoretskih pristupa procesu evropeizacije, pre svega institucionalizma racionalnog izbora i noramtivnog institucionalizma, i to na primeru Srbije. Čitav proces evropeizacije postavljen je u kontekst šireg procesa evropskih integracija regiona Zapadnog Balkana, a tekst otkriva najdublje interese kojima se rukovode Evropska unija i Srbija u samom procesu. Ovakav pristup procesu evropeizacije odslikava karakteristike puta Srbije ka EU, a posebna pažnja je posvećena politici uslovljavanja, koju Evropska unija sprovodi prema Srbiji, kao državi koja želi da postane njen član. Tekst se naročito bavi jasnoćom uslova, brzinom nagrađivanja i centrifugalnim silama samog procesa.",
publisher = "Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd",
journal = "Međunarodna politika",
title = "Europeanization of Serbia, Evropeizacija Srbije",
pages = "112-90",
number = "1153-1154",
volume = "65",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_474"
}

Nedeljković, S.. (2014). Europeanization of Serbia. in Međunarodna politika
Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd., 65(1153-1154), 90-112.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_474

Nedeljković S. Europeanization of Serbia. in Međunarodna politika. 2014;65(1153-1154):90-112.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_474 .

Nedeljković, Stevan, "Europeanization of Serbia" in Međunarodna politika, 65, no. 1153-1154 (2014):90-112,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rfpn_474 .